

ARMY DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 14
(Rev. 8 Oct. 44)

RESTRICTED WHEN ENTRIES ARE MADE HEREON

ARMY AIR FORCES

REPORT OF MAJOR ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AAF Reg. 62-14 and "Aircraft Accident Investigator's Handbook" issued by Office of Flying Safety, Headquarters, AAF.

Fill in all spaces except where otherwise indicated.

If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

FIELD OFFICES—DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	AC	DATE	TYPE, MODEL, AND SERIES	ACCIDENT NO.
	PRELIMINARY REPORT RECEIVED	11-28		
	FORM 14 RECEIVED	12-18		
	EVALUATED BY			
	VARIOUS BY			
CHECKED BY				
CODING BY				
				NO. AIRCRAFT INVOLVED

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION									
1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT—State, County, Nearest Town, Distance and Direction from Same.					Nearest Army Airfield, Distance and Direction from Same.				
Mississippi, Harrison, Biloxi, 37 miles south					Keesler Field, 38 miles south				
2. WAS COLLISION WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT?		AF NO. OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft)			DATE		HOURS AND TIME ZONE		☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT
☐ Yes ☒ No					11/27/44		1716C		
Section B—AIRCRAFT									
1. AIRCRAFT NO.		2. TYPE MODEL SERIES		3. HOME STATION					
42-24447		B-29		Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas					
4. AIR FORCE OR COMMAND		SUBCOMMAND		WING		GROUP NO. AND TYPE		SQUADRON	
Second		XXI Bomber		314th		19th Bomb. (VH)		93rd	
5. DATE OF MANUFACTURE (purchase)		TOTAL HOURS		DATE LAST OVERHAUL		OVERHAULING DEPOT OR SUB-DEPOT		HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL	
May 12, 1944		685:30		None		None		None	
6. Attach detailed statement of tech orders having direct bearing on this accident which have not been complied with. Describe orders and give reasons for noncompliance.									
Section C—OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)									
1. LAST NAME		FIRST NAME		MIDDLE INITIAL		GRADE		BRANCH	
HAMMOND		EUGENE		W		1st Lt.		A.C.	
2. ATTACHED STATION		AF OR COMMAND		SUBCOMMAND		WING		GROUP NO. AND TYPE	
9340		Second		XXI Bomber		314th		19th Bomb. (VH)	
3. ASSIGNED STATION		AF OR COMMAND		SUBCOMMAND		WING		GROUP NO. AND TYPE	
AAB, Great Bend, Kans.		Second		XXI Bomber		314th		19th Bomb. (VH)	
4. AERONAUTICAL RATING?		☒ Yes ☐ No		PRESENT RATING		DATE RECEIVED		5. NORMAL DUTY STATUS	
				Pilot		3-13-42		Airplane Commander	
Section D—OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including civilian)									
FLYING TIME		1ST PILOT OR SOLO STUDENT		OTHER PILOT OR OTHER STUDENT		Fill in items 8 and 9 only if operator was student in training or rated pilot in CIS, OTU, etc.			
1. TOTAL HOURS		1369:07		309:33		8. TRAINEE CLASS NO. AND SCHOOL, OTU, CCTS, ETC.			
2. HOURS THIS TYPE		69:30		56:10		19th Bomb. Group (VH), AAF Great Bend, Kansas			
3. HOURS THIS MODEL		69:30		56:10		9. PHASE AND HOURS IN THIS PHASE			
4. HOURS LAST 90 DAYS		88:15		9:55		11. INSTRUMENT RATING			
5. HOURS LAST 30 DAYS		39:05		9:55		TYPE			
6. HOURS LAST 24 HOURS		5:45		5:45		DATE			
7. ACTUAL COMBAT HOURS		None		None		7 Apr. 44			
						LAST CHECK STATION			
						Alamogordo			
						12. Was operator on instruments at time of accident or immediately before?			
						☐ Yes ☒ No			
						13. TOTAL—INSTRUMENT			
						LAST 6 MOS.			
						LAST 30 DAYS			
						14. INSTRUMENT			
						LAST 6 MOS.			
						LAST 30 DAYS			
						15. NIGHT, LAST 6 MOS.			
						16. NIGHT, LAST 30 DAYS			
10. AAF SCHOOLS PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AND DATES									
Cal-Aero Academy 4/42. VAFS, Victorville, 6/42.									
Mather Field, Sacramento (FLG Instr. Course) 7/42.									
HAAF, Hobbs, N.M., 4-Eng. Train. 8/42.									
Lockbourne B-17 Instr. Stand. Course, 3/44.									
Section E—PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)									
DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	NAME (Last Name First)	TYPE OF AERO. RATING (Symbol)	SERIAL NO.	GRADE AND BRANCH OF SERVICE	PERM. CLASS. SYMBOL (AAF Reg. 15-1)	ORG. ASSIGNMENT—AIR FORCE OR COMMAND GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE STATION	FATAL MAJOR MINOR NONE MISSING UNKNOWN	USED	SUCCESSFUL
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
P	Hammond, Eugene W.	P	0-726639	1st Lt. AC	01	2d AF, 19th Bomb	None	X	(X)
AC	Gresham, Edwin R.	AC	0-771702	2nd Lt. AC	18	(VH, 21st Bomb)	Mag	X	(X)
B	Bigelow, Fred H.	B	0-728047	1st Lt. AC	01	" " "	Min	X	(X)
N	Clark, James C.	E	0-2063363	2nd Lt. AC	18	" " "	Ftl	X	(X)
E	Kelley, John	E	0-960701	2nd Lt. AC	18	" " "	Mag	X	(X)
O	Melland, Roger F.	O	0-725064	Capt. AC	01	" " "	Mag	X	(X)
R	Rife, Robert D.	R	15375525	Pfc. AC	20	" " "	Mag	X	(X)
V	Schaefferley, John B.	V	33513726	Cpl. AC	38	" " "	Mag	X	(X)
G	Little, Richard H.	G	35903370	Pfc. AC	38	" " "	Mag	X	(X)
G	Jones, William L.	G	14202825	Cpl. AC	20	" " "	Min	X	(X)
G	Johnson, Ned C.	G	37224492	Cpl. AC	38	" " "	Min	X	(X)
G	Kennedy, George D.	G	13187685	Cpl. AC	20	" " "	Mag	X	(X)

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10-41100-1

Section F—DAMAGE				
Describe briefly the extent of the damage which occurred. (If no damage, write "None." If aircraft is missing, write "Missing." If aircraft was totally wrecked, so state)				
1. TO AIRCRAFT No. 1 nacelle completely destroyed				
2. TO ENGINE	1. Complete loss (tore loose and fell into Gulf)	2.	3.	4.
3. TO PROPELLER	1. Complete loss	2.	3.	4.
4. TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (REPAIR OR ATTACHMENTS) None				

Section G—POWER PLANT FAILURE				
(Use this section of the form if power plant failure was a contributing cause factor in the accident. This must be signed by engineering officer)			1. DURATION OF FLIGHT SINCE LAST TAKE-OFF	
	(1)	(2)	HOURS	MINUTES
2. ENGINE MODEL	R 3350-23A			
3. ENGINE NO.	43-149573			
4. ENGINE-HOURS SINCE LAST MAJOR OVERHAUL	20 hrs. 05 min.			
5. DEPOT OR SUB-DEPOT PERFORMING OVERHAUL	OCCASO			
6. TOTAL ENGINE-HOURS	344 hrs. 05 min.			
7. PROPELLER MODEL	Hamilton Hydromatic			
8. PROPELLER-HOURS SINCE MAJOR OVERHAUL	381 hrs. 55 min.			
9. STATEMENT OF OPERATOR, IF AVAILABLE, ON BEHAVIOR OF POWER PLANT AND MANIPULATION OF CONTROLS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE FAILURE Engine was functioning normally up to time of fire. Then manifold pressure dropped from 30" to 28" at which time throttle was closed. Propeller could not be feathered and engine tore loose from nacelle.				
10. STATEMENT OF ENGINEERING OFFICER, MECHANIC, AND OTHERS AS TO WHAT FAILED AND PROBABLE REASONS WHY Probably broken or badly leaking fuel line near rear section which caught fire and burned thru upper section of nacelle, thus permitting engine to drop free and tear loose.				
11. OCTANE RATING OF FUEL	ENGINEERING OFFICER (Name, Grade, and Station) MERRILL E. CARLTON, Jr., MAJOR, A.C. Keesler Field, Mississippi			

Section H—AIRFRAME, LANDING GEAR, OR OTHER MATERIEL	
(Use this section if materiel failure was a contributing cause factor in the accident. This must be signed by engineering officer)	
1. DESCRIBE THE MATERIEL FAILURE, INCLUDING STATEMENT OF KIND OF FLIGHT AT THE TIME OF FAILURE AND ALL FACTORS WHICH MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TOWARD THE FAILURE	
ENGINEERING OFFICER (Name, Grade, and Station) →	

Section I—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	
(Use this section if special equipment—parachutes, radio, dinghies, oxygen equipment, fire extinguishers, etc.—was a contributing cause factor in the accident for any reason including failure, misuse, or by reason of not being in the plane)	
1. DESCRIBE HOW THE SPECIAL EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT OR TO ITS RESULTS Engine fire extinguisher system was actuated and directed to the nacelle accessory section of V1 engine, both bottles were expended but did not quench fire. All parachutes functioned but it is believed Mac West vest lacked sufficient buoyancy to support airman whose heavy clothing became water logged.	

16-41000-1

Section K—AIRPORT AND FACILITIES AND AIRW	
(Use this section if the airport or its facilities or airways facilities were a contributing factor in the accident, either because of inadequacy, condition, or maintenance)	
1. EXPLAIN	
Section K—WEATHER (This must be signed by weather officer of the reporting station)	
1. WHAT WAS THE WEATHER AT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT? Nearest station DOX 1728 CWT Φ / 186/62/3848/007	
2. IF WEATHER WAS A FACTOR IN THE ACCIDENT, STATE HOW AND ATTACH COPY OF WEATHER REPORTS Waves were estimated to be 4' high which made observation difficult from surface craft in regards to rescue work. Darkness occurred shortly after the search (air) commenced which also badly handicapped observers.	
WEATHER OFFICER (Name, Grade, and Station)	STERLING J. KNIGHT, 1st/Lt., AC, Keesler Field, Miss.
Section L—GENERAL INFORMATION	
1. IF ERROR ON THE PART OF SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE OPERATOR WAS A FACTOR, STATE HOW	
2. WHAT WAS THE MISSION? Bombing and Navigation celestial and overwater	
3. DID FIRE OCCUR BEFORE ☒ Yes ☐ No	
4. WERE THERE ANY VIOLATIONS OF ORDERS OR REGULATIONS? (Explain) NONE	
5. DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN OR CONTEMPLATED NONE	
6. KIND OF CLEARANCE (Attach Form 25) IFR	FROM TO OR LOCAL Great Bend, Kans. Havana and return via Freemason Island
7. IF UR FORM 54 HAS BEEN SUBMITTED ON ANY FEATURE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT, GIVE UR No. AND DATE	No. DATE 44-145 12-11-64
8. EXPLAIN FULLY AND ATTACH COPY Engine #1 tore loose in flight after fire burned upper half of nacelle.	
9. ARE COPIES OF AAF FORMS 1, 1A, ATTACHED HERETO AS REQUIRED BY AAF REGULATION 49-147? ☒ Yes ☐ No	
10. ARE PHOTOS ATTACHED? ☒ Yes ☐ No	

Section M—DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

1. TELL IN NARRATIVE FORM, IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS NECESSARY, EVERYTHING THAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE ACCIDENT. BE SURE TO COVER EVERYTHING THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TOWARD THE ACCIDENT. INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION TO PREVENT SIMILAR ACCIDENTS, AND ACTION TAKEN.

Pilot Hammond's judgment thruout the emergency was orderly and correct and his airmanship technique was superior at all times. This Board is of the opinion that Lt. Hammond's command for his crew to bail out at the time they did was the correct procedure.

Two of the survivors counted eleven (11) parachutes including their own while descending, and it is believed that all of the parachutes functioned properly.

Rescue work was difficult because the incident was reported fifteen (15) minutes before sundown and darkness approached very rapidly. Several planes reached the area, and it has been definitely determined that a total of seven different dye markers were observed in the water, altho Cpl. Johnson was the only survivor who was located and rescued by aircraft.

A careful analysis has been made of the flight engineer's chart which was conducted throughout the flight, and it appears that a loss of over one hundred (100) gallons of fuel had occurred after a point at which manifold pressure and RPM had been decreased, and the mixture control had been changed from rich to automatic lean. There is a strong likelihood that the fuel line leading to #1 engine became ruptured so as to cause a severe fuel leakage near the rear engine section. It is the opinion of this Board that burning exhaust gases ignited the leaking fuel causing the fire to burn thru the propeller feathering mechanism and eventually thru the entire upper side of the nacelle. The #1 fuel tank was completely empty when the plane landed while the #2 fuel tanks contained nearly 1300 gallons. The Pilot states that he had not given any order to transfer fuel, altho it is probable that the Flight Engineer attempted a fuel transfer when the emergency arose. The booster pump valve handle was broken off but a check of the rheostat reveals that it was in the "off" position.

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2. Recommendations

Personal Equipment Officers at Air Bases that clear airmen for overwater missions should emphasize necessity to remove heavy flying clothing following parachute descent into water. Men should also be advised of prevailing ocean temperatures and that

~~xxx recommendation~~ water soaked clothing does not give protection against coldness. Airmen stranded while floating on water should have brightly colored gaseous balloon with approximately 20 feet of light twine fastened to shoulder straps to assist searchers to determine their location.

Night water search would be facilitated if lost floating personnel had a small light extending from such a balloon as proposed in previous paragraph, or fastened on their foreheads.

3. ACTION TAKEN

The suggestions in the previous paragraph have been forwarded to the Experimental and Development Section of the Emergency Rescue School at this station for appraisal and comment.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING BOARD FROM REPORTING STATION. EACH MEMBER MUST SIGN.

STATION:

Keesler Field, Mississippi

NAME—PRESIDENT		NAME—MEMBER		NAME—MEMBER		NAME—MEMBER	
WILLIAM H. MCARTHUR (Absent)		CHARLES I. STOPPER		MAJOR C. BRACEY		MAJOR C. BRACEY	
GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION
Transferred 12-4-44)		Lt. Col, AC	3704th AAF B.U.	Major, AC	3704th AAF B.U.		
NAME—MEMBER		NAME—MEMBER		NAME—MEMBER		NAME—MEMBER	
MERRILL H. CARLTON, Jr.		LEO H. MARNEY		ROBERT I. PAULIN			
GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION
Major, AC	3704th AAF B.U.	Lt. Col, AC	3704th AAF B.U.	Br. AC	3704th AAF B.U.		

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Lt. Hammond next made a descending left circle and determined that the parachutists appeared to be fairly well grouped and estimated that he noted at least ten open chutes. The Pilot was not quite certain of the closest suitable airdrome and put the plane on automatic pilot. He then moved over to the right side of the plane, obtained a facility chart and tuned the radio compass to the Keesler radio range frequency. He next raised his landing gear and then called the Keesler Field Tower on his command set at 1716 C. It is estimated that the entire sequence of events from the sighting of the fire to the radio call occupied four minutes, and no other radio message was broadcast during the emergency up to this moment. Pilot Hammond advised the Tower that his entire crew had bailed out approximately 15 miles west of Freemason Island, and that he was proceeding to Keesler Field to attempt an emergency landing. He was advised that Runway 31, which favored the prevailing wind, would be reserved for his landing attempt.

The Operations Officer was advised by the Tower thru the "squawk box" and immediately ordered all rescue boats to proceed full speed toward Chandeleur Island, and that further instructions would be given enroute. The Keesler Field crash fire system was alerted, and the plane appeared from the southwest about 1727 CWT. It was flying in a level attitude and appeared to be descending from about 3000 ft. at a high rate of vertical descent, (1000 ft. per minute). The Pilot accomplished a shallow base leg (approximately 30°) and came into his final approach from about 2000 feet, still descending very rapidly. Runway 31 at this station, altho 6500' in length, is very deceptive because it has tall trees on both immediate ends and has been exempted from compliance with AAF Approach Clearance Zone requirements. The Station Accident Officer observed the landing and states that up to the last 200 feet the plane still maintained a high rate of vertical descent, and the Pilot reacted with full power on the three remaining engines in such a manner that the airplane completed a difficult landing. The landing was accomplished with the landing gear extended, both bomb bay doors open, and full flaps, and it was not an abnormally hard landing. He estimates the plane landed with the same effect as an aircraft which might stall about 6 feet above the runway.

It was noted at this time that the #1 Engine was missing and there were no outward appearances of continued danger from fire. The plane was directed by the Tower to a parking place on the runway and, on observing only one man on board, the Line Chief climbed up into the cabin and asked the pilot whether or not he wanted his engines cut. The Pilot replied in the affirmative and the three remaining engines were shut down, but not before a large torch-like fire was emitted from #3 Engine exhaust. It is believed that the latter incident was due to lack of Aerial Engineer to open the cowl flaps while taxiing for three minutes.

2 B 727

The B-29 had been flying nearly 5½ hours and was accomplishing a bombing mission at Freemason Island 36 miles south of this station before proceeding to Havana, Cuba on a celestial navigation mission and returning non-stop to its home base at Great Bend, Kansas. The aircraft was flying at 12,000 feet and had completed its third run over the target three minutes before and was headed in a southerly direction. At this point Cpl. Jones, the left scanner, noted very heavy smoke coming from the lower part of #1 engine nacelle and called over to Cpl. Ned Johnson, the right scanner, to alert the Flight Engineer on the interphone to inform him of the situation. Cpl. Jones, who sighted the smoke, had an inoperative interphone station.

Lt. Hammond, the pilot, was listening on interphone and heard the alarm and looked immediately toward the #1 engine, and observed the whole nacelle in heavy flames, which had broken out from the time that the smoke was first observed. Lt. Hammond's immediate reaction was as follows: closed the #1 throttle, ordered the aerial engineer to accomplish emergency procedure on the #1 engine, and then he attempted to feather the propeller on the burning engine. He next ordered the Co-pilot to alert and check the crew and prepare them for abandoning ship. The feathering attempt was unsuccessful and the attempt of the engineer to extinguish the fire with his mechanical extinguishing equipment also failed. The bombardier was also ordered to jettison his bombs and bomb bay tanks which he accomplished with the Pilot who also pulled his emergency lever. Up to this point it is estimated that two minutes were consumed from the time the fire started.

The flames continued unabated and when Lt. Hammond issued the command to abandon ship, after having received information from the Co-pilot that the entire crew was prepared, seven men bailed out in an orderly fashion. The Pilot also lowered his landing gear and changed his heading to westerly which appeared to be the nearest point to shore, and placed the plane on "automatic pilot" and noted that he was now 10,000 feet and awaited his turn to clear the ship.

While five men were still on board the forward part of the plane, including Lt. Bigelow, the bombardier, the aircraft became unmanageable and executed a sharp left spiral. Lt. Hammond disengaged his "automatic" and recovered control of the plane manually while four of the remaining airmen bailed out. Lt. Hammond was preparing to follow them and looked toward the #1 engine and noted that the engine had torn free and that the fire had extinguished itself. Lt. Bigelow, one of the latter group who bailed out, noted a black spot fall past the descending airmen which may have been the engine.

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT FORMS & RECORDS

End. 7

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2 AF FORM 384-A

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

CRUISE CONTROL LOG

CONDITION	CLC TIME SETTING	TOTAL TIME	PRESSURE ALTITUDE	TEMP	IAS	TAS	COMB FLAPS	RPM	MP	MIX	FUEL FLOW	FUEL USED	TOTAL FUEL USED	FUEL REMAINING	GROSS WEIGHT	DIST	TOTAL DIST.
FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A
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FUEL WILL BE IN GPH
(ENTRIES WILL BE MADE EACH HOUR
OR AT POWER SETTING CHANGES)

FLIGHT NOTES -

1. Fuel flow should always be checked
2. Fuel flow should be checked at 1000 ft
3. Fuel flow should be checked at 2000 ft
4. Fuel flow should be checked at 3000 ft
5. Fuel flow should be checked at 4000 ft
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82. Fuel flow should be checked at 81000 ft
83. Fuel flow should be checked at 82000 ft
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100. Fuel flow should be checked at 99000 ft

CO CO
MCC. MC

45-11-27-2

D. 74 - 12-7-54

See also 212

Box 14-25

11/77/54

B-29 FLIGHT PLAN 2AF FORM 334

SQUADRON NO <u>28</u>	A. COMMANDER <u>J. M. ...</u>	FROM <u>2800</u>	VIA <u>...</u>
GROUP NO <u>18</u>	FLIGHT ENG <u>...</u>	VIA <u>...</u>	VIA <u>...</u>
AIRPLANE NO <u>447</u>	DATE <u>11-27-44</u>	VIA <u>...</u>	TO <u>...</u>


FUEL-WING TANKS <u>560</u>	BOMBS-FRONT <u>1000</u> REAR <u>1800</u>	FUEL EST. <u>...</u>
FUEL-CENTER TANKS <u>1120</u>	AMMUNIT-50 CAL <u>2000</u> 20 MM <u>...</u>	RESERVE EST. <u>1500</u>
FUEL BOMB TANKS <u>1280</u>	BASIC WT. EMPTY <u>...</u>	FUEL DENSITY <u>...</u>
TOTAL FUEL <u>8000</u>	GROSS WEIGHT <u>132,132</u>	GROUND TEMP. <u>...</u>

FLIGHT CONDITIONS (NO WIND)					
CONDITIONS	ALT.	I.A.S.	DIST.	TIME	POWER SETS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					

RADAR EXT <u>...</u> MI FROM TARGET	BOMB DOORS OPEN
RADAR EXT <u>...</u> MI FROM BASE	MIN. MIL.

SCHEMATIC FLIGHT PLAN

FLIGHT PROGRESS CHART



DATE 11-27-44		STATION GB AAF	GROUP NO. & TYPE 19th Bomb. Group	AIRCRAFT MODEL B-29					
CREW CHIEF OR AERIAL ENGINEER S/Sgt. C. Matters		AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 42-24447							
NAME - ASN - GRADE - ORGANIZATION PRINT PLAINLY -		SQUADRON NO. & TYPE 93rd Bomb. Sq.							
PERS. CLASS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
			USE AS DIRECTED LOCALLY	ALWAYS ENTER DUTY SYMBOLS WHEN APPLICABLE. ENTER TIME FLOWN HEREUNDER.	DUTY	NO. OF LANDING	NO. OF LANDING	NO. OF LANDING	NO. OF LANDING
01	Hammond, Eugene W., 1st Lt., O-726639	232nd Sq. (VZ)	P	5:45	DOE	1	11:45		
18	Gresham, Edwin H., 2nd Lt., O-771702		AC	5:45	Keesler Field	1	17:30		
6	Bigelow, Fred H., 1st Lt., O-725047		B	5:45	T	1	5:45		
18	Clark, James C., 2nd Lt., O-2063363		H	5:45					
18	Kelley, John, 2nd Lt., O-860701		B	5:45					
01	Holland, Stacy F., Capt., O-725064		O	5:45					
20	Rife, Robert D., Pfc., 15375525		R	5:45					
38	Schaeberley, John B., Cpl., 33513726		V	5:45					
38	Little, Richard H., Pfc., 35903370		O	5:45					
38	Jones, William K., Cpl., 14202825		O	5:45					
38	Johnson, Ned C., Cpl., 37224492		O	5:45					
20	Kennedy, George J., 13187665		O	5:45					
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY		JOHN W. ROSS, CWO, USA, ASST. OPS. OFFICER.							

AIRPLANE FLIGHT REPORT - OPERATIONS

 1. AIR DEPARTMENT
 2. FORM NO. 1
 REV. 1 JAN. 44

 CHECKED: ☐ LEGIBLE AND CORRECT
 TRANSCRIBED: ☐ TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ENTERED ON FORM 1A
 TOTAL FLIGHT TIME 8:45

INSPECTION STATUS				SERVICING AT TIME OF TAKE-OFF (CHECK IMMEDIATELY BEFORE TAKE-OFF)																																																			
	DATE OF OR HOURS DUE	INSPECTED TODAY		SERVICE	FUEL (GALLONS)		OIL (QUARTS)								RADIATOR CHECKED																																								
		BY	STATION		SERVICED	IN TANKS	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	No. 4	No. 5	No. 6	No. 7	No. 8																																									
PREFLIGHT	1-27-44	H																																																					
DAILY	1-27-44	H	AAP Grant																																																				
25 HOURS	05:00																																																						
50 HOURS	14:05		Good, Kansas																																																				
100 HOURS	22:25																																																						
INSPECTION OF AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT				STATUS TODAY		EXPLANATIONS																																																	
EQUIPMENT	SYMBOL	INSPECTED BY	STATION	1.	2.	EXCEPTIONAL RELEASE WHEN THE "STATUS TODAY" IS INDICATED BY A RED SYMBOL AND AN "EXCEPTIONAL RELEASE" HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED BY AN AUTHORIZED MAINTENANCE OFFICER, THE PILOT OF THIS AIRCRAFT WILL SIGN THIS RELEASE BEFORE FLIGHT. RELEASED FOR FLIGHT 1. W. Hammond 3 2. 4																																																	
BOMBARDMENT	H	Rand	GRAAF																																																				
GUNNERY	S	Edman	GRAAF																																																				
CHEMICAL																																																							
COMMUNICATIONS	B	Brooks	GRAAF																																																				
PHOTOGRAPHIC	W	Walters	GRAAF			REMARKS: ENGINE FIRE IN FLIGHT - SEE INSTRUCTIONS INSIDE FRONT COVER Engine Fire in Flight, Prop would not feather, Fire could not be extinguished, Engine tore off of ship																																																	
NAVIGATION	N	Walters	GRAAF																																																				
Radar	DC	Comman	GRAAF																																																				
AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE TIME RECORD (ENTER IN HOURS AND MINUTES)						<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>No. 1</th> <th>No. 2</th> <th>No. 3</th> <th>No. 4</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>ENGINE TO DATE</td> <td>14:50</td> <td>178:45</td> <td>07:20</td> <td>202:45</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TOTAL</td> <td>5:15</td> <td>8:45</td> <td>5:45</td> <td>3:45</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OIL CHANGE DUE</td> <td>20:04</td> <td>178:30</td> <td>03:05</td> <td>205:30</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CURD CLEANING DUE</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="3">AIRCRAFT</td> <td colspan="2">HOURS TO DATE</td> <td colspan="2">279:45</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">HOURS TODAY</td> <td colspan="2">8:45</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">TOTAL</td> <td colspan="2">288:30</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>													No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	No. 4	ENGINE TO DATE	14:50	178:45	07:20	202:45	TOTAL	5:15	8:45	5:45	3:45	OIL CHANGE DUE	20:04	178:30	03:05	205:30	CURD CLEANING DUE					AIRCRAFT	HOURS TO DATE		279:45		HOURS TODAY		8:45		TOTAL		288:30	
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	TOTAL		288:30																																																				
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:						<i>[Signature]</i> Oxygen serviced to 400% - Anderson & Glynn JOHN W. MOSE, CMD, USA, Asst. Operations Officer.																																																	
DATE 11-27-44				AIR FORCE 2nd AFF				COMPONENT Bombardment				ENGINE MODEL R-3350-24A																																											
STATION GRAAF				COMD., SERV. COMD. OR DEPT. 21st Bomber Group No. and Type				AIRCRAFT MODEL B-29				SERIAL NO. 43-149575																																											
CREW CHIEF OR ENGINEER Sgt. Walters				SQUADRON NO. AND TYPE L(19th GP 93rd Sq				AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 42-24447				SERIAL NO. 42-83908																																											
												TOTAL FLIGHT TIME → 9-																																											

WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF FORM NO. 23
(REVISED AUG. 15, 1943)

ARMY AIR FORCES
AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL REPORT

OPERATIONS OFFICE	ARMY AIR BASE
ADDRESS	GREAT BEND, KANSAS

DATE	11/27/44
------	----------

PILOT'S NAME B HAMMOND, E. W.	RANK 1st Lt.	HOME STATION DGE	ORGANIZATION 19th Bomb. Gp	AIRCRAFT NUMBER 447
NAME, INITIALS, RANK, HOME STATION OF OTHER OCCUPANTS				
GRESHAM, E. H., 2nd Lt.		Johnson, W.C., Cpl.		
CLARK, J. C., 2d Lt.		JONES, G.K. Cpl.		
Bigelow, F. H. 1st Lt.		KENNEDY, G.J., Cpl.		
KELLEY, J. F., 2d Lt.		SCHAEFERLEY, J.B., Cpl.		
RIPE, R. D., Pfc.		HOLLAND, S.F., Capt.		
LITTLE, R. H., Pfc.				

The weight and balance status of this aircraft is identical with that shown on Form F filed at DGE Field on 11/27/44 at 28th B Sqd VM.

LIST ADDITIONAL PASSENGERS ON SEPARATE SHEET

C WEATHER DATA		EXISTING LOCAL	ALTIMETER SETTINGS
EXISTING ROUTE			LOCAL
DESTINATION (LATEST)		TIME	DESTINATION
ALTERNATE (LATEST)		TIME	ALTERNATE
FORECASTS (ESTIMATED FLIGHT TIME PLUS 2 HOURS)			RESET ALTIMETER BEFORE APPROACH
ROUTE			
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY: <i>John W. Ross</i>			
		JOHN W. ROSS,	
		CWO, USA,	
		Asst. Operations Officer.	
DESTINATION			
ALTERNATE			
WINDS ALOFT GIVE ALT. DIR. VEL. AS PILOT REQUESTS			
AAF FORM 23A REQUIRED ☐		NOT REQUIRED ☐	FORECASTER TIME

FLIGHT PLAN (PILOT COMPLETES) RADIO CALLS		TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	PILOT (LAST NAME ONLY)	POINT OF DEPARTURE
D PLAN 2447		B-29	Hammond	DGE
1 ALT 8000	2 ALT 12,000	3 ALT 20,000	4 ALT 8,000	
☐ CFR ROUTE Direct	☐ CFR ROUTE Direct	☐ CFR ROUTE Direct	☐ CFR ROUTE Direct	
☒ IFR ROUTE Eldorado, Ark.	☒ IFR ROUTE Gulfport	☒ IFR ROUTE Batista, Cuba	☒ IFR ROUTE DGE	
AIRPORT OF FIRST INTENDED LANDING DGE		TRUE AIR SPEED 200	4494	TRANSMITTING FREQUENCIES KC 7045
PROPOSED TAKE-OFF TIME 08:55	EST. TIME IN ROUTE 15 / 00	ALTERNATE AIRPORT OL	HOURS OF FUEL (CRAFTING) 18	INSTRUMENT RATING NONE white
REMARKS: SHOW FIXES WHICH WILL BE REPORTED WHILE ON INSTRUMENT FLIGHT.		FLIGHT PRIORITY 3-2		
Palma Radio		Texarkana Radio		
Batista Radio		New Orleans Radio		
PILOT'S SIGNATURE EUGENE W. HAMMOND				
TOWER FREQUENCIES DESTINATION 327 KC	ALTERNATE 376 KC	WEATHER CODE RECEIVED ☒ YES ☐ NO	TO DESTINATION 3,000	DIST. TO ALTERNATE 200
		☐ COMMAND ☐ SENIOR ☐ CONTRACT PILOT ☒ PILOT		

E FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION			
SUBMITTED TO	TIME	BY	OPERATIONS IDENTIFICATION NO.
TIME APPROVAL RECEIVED	CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED		CLEARING AUTHORITY
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANSMITTED TO PILOT OR TOWER BY		ACTUAL TAKE-OFF TIME	CLEARANCE OFFICER

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Accident Report, A-29, AOCM: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field, 27 November 1944.	
TO: Office of Chief of Regions, OPS, Winston-Salem, N. C.	DATE 11 January 45
FROM: Chief, Safety Region Seven, OPS, Kansas City, Missouri	COMMENT NO. <u>2</u> JAF/lcl/Ha 0914
1. Forwarded for your information and further handling. 2. Recommendations contained in Comment 1, paragraph 4, subparagraphs 1 and 2, to be coordinated by this office. Second Air Force reactions will be forwarded under separate cover. 3. Comments on recommendations 3, 4, and 5 requested.	
Incl n/c	JAMES A. WISK Lt. Colonel, Air Corps Chief, Safety Region Seven

Accident Report, B-29, ACSN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field,
27 November 1944

Office of Chief of Regions, OFS, Winston-Salem, N. C.

11 January 45

Chief, Safety Region Seven, OFS, Kansas City, Missouri

JAF/lcl/Ra 0914²

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Incl
n/c

JAMES A. FISK
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Safety Region Seven

Accident Report, B-29, ACORN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Reesler Field,
27 November 1944

Office of Chief of Regions, OFS, Winston-Salem, N. C.

11 January 45

Chief, Safety Region Seven, OFS, Kansas City, Missouri

2
JAF/lcl/Ha 0914

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Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Safety Region Seven

Accident Report, B-29, ACEN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field,
27 November 1944

Office of Chief of Regions, OCS, Winston-Salem, N. C.

11 January 45

Chief, Safety Region Seven, OCS, Kansas City, Missouri

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Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Safety Region Seven

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT:

TO:

DATE

FROM:

COMMENT NO. _____

COMMENT NO. 1 - continued -

4. That the following equipment be made available to crews of army flying boats:

One life preserver with rope attachment.

5. That the appropriate research division be contacted regarding possible design and use of the following:

A series of sea markers contained together in such a manner that the action of water on the enclosing substance (at a predetermined rate of dissolving) would liberate a sea marker at designated intervals. The advantage of such a device is that at time of bail out over water the container could be thrown out with attached parachute. Intermittent markers would indicate the direction of current to searchers and at the same time provide a series of markers extending over a considerable area enhancing the possibility of locating the general area containing the survivors.

5. To date no action has been taken on any recommendations. It is recommended that this office forward all approved recommendations through channels to the proper command for comment and action.

EUGENE W. ROUSSEAU
Captain, Air Corps
Regional Safety Officer.

1 Incl--
Accident Report w/attachments.

PAGE _____

3-1100 A.F.

COMMENT NO. 1 - continued -

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EUGENE W. RODENBERRY
Captain, Air Corps
Regional Safety Officer.

1 Incl--

Accident Report w/attachments.

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Captain, Air Corps
Regional Safety Officer.

1 Incl--
Accident Report w/attachments.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 42-24447, Great Bend AFB, near Keesler Field, 27

Nov. 1944

TO: Chief, Safety Region Seven, CFS, Kansas City, Mo.

DATE 3 January 45

FROM: Captain Eugene W. Roddenberry, RSO, Safety Region Seven.

COMMENT NO. 1

EWR/lis/Ha 0914

1. Attached is report on B-29 accident which occurred at Keesler Field, Mississippi, 27 November 1944.

2. Transmission of this report from this officer was considerably delayed due to, first, illness contracted while enroute to Keesler Field for a second visit in order to pick up pertinent information, and second, orders to return to home office before investigation was satisfactorily concluded in the field. The report was finished by means of telephone and mail.

3. It is believed that considerable study of the search and rescue problems involved in this accident and in similar accidents is valuable in light of the extensive over-water operations now being performed in the Pacific theater by B-29 aircraft. Such a survey may secure basis for improvement of equipment and technique. The loss of life in this case serves to point out that some improvement is probably desirable and that, if success is desired in cases where greater distances, fewer craft of all types, and danger from enemy action is present, existing technique and equipment may prove insufficient.

4. Following recommendations are made on the report:

1. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies of strategically located fields near the route of flight, especially those with Sea Rescue equipment.
2. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies used by search, crash, and patrol vessels in the area passed, and that coordination with such units be established so that pertinent information concerning the whereabouts and availability of such sea craft is available to crews participating in such missions.
3. That the following equipment be made available to crews participating in overwater flight for attachment to the life belts:

One metal signaling mirror.

Two or more extra dye markers.

One metal whistle incorporating the best features available of sound distance, penetration of other noises, and volume of sound.

One waterproof flash lamp.

PAGE _____

B-1109 A.F.

Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field, 27
Nov. 1944

Chief, Safety Region Seven, OES, Kansas City, Mo.

3 January 45

Captain Eugene W. Roddenberry, HSO, Safety Region Seven.

1
EMR/lis/ha 0914

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Accident Report, 8-29, RSM: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field, 27
 Nov. 1944

Chief, Safety Region Seven, AFB, Kansas City, Mo.

3 January 45

Captain Eugene F. Roddenberry, RSM, Safety Region Seven.

1
 RSM/lis/ma 0914

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Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 43-24447, Great Bend AFB, near Keesler Field, 27
Nov. 1944

Chief, Safety Region Seven, USA, Kansas City, Mo.

3 January 45

Captain Eugene A. Roddenberry, SAC, Safety Region Seven.

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SBR/lis/na 0914

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RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE ACTION
ROUTING SLIPDate 25 Jan 45

B-29 ACCIDENT REPORT

TO: IN BUCH

✓ (1) DEPUTY CHIEF

IN: Date 25 Jan Hour 2:30 pmOUT: Date 27 Jan Hour 12:00 pm

(4) TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

IN: Date 21-45 Hour 1515OUT: Date 2-9-45 Hour 1630Returned to
Nashville 12-10-45
BY a - 214-14-45

✓ (2) MATERIAL AND MAINTENANCE

IN: Date 27 Jan Hour 13:50OUT: Date 2 Feb 45 Hour 11:45

(3) OFFICE OF CHIEF OF REGIONS

IN: Date 1 Feb 45 Hour 15:30OUT: Date 1 Feb 45 Hour 16:00

(6) ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

IN: Date 13 Feb Hour 11:30

(5) MEDICAL SAFETY

IN: Date 12 Feb 45 Hour 16:45OUT: Date 12 Feb 45 Hour 21:01

RESTRICTED

ST/0216-44 (7)

1715

RESTRICTED

Accident Report, B-29, ACSN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field,
27 November 1944

Office of Chief of Regions, OPS, Winston-Salem, N. C.

11 January 45

Chief, Safety Region Seven, OPS, Kansas City, Missouri

2
JAF/lcl/Ha 0914

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JAMES A. FISK
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Safety Region Seven

RESTRICTED

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Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 42-24447, Great Bend AFB, near Keesler Field, 27
Nove. 1944

Chief, Safety Region Seven, OPS, Kansas City, Mo.

3 January 45

Captain Eugene W. Roddenberry, HSO, Safety Region Seven.

1
RHR/lis/ha 0914

1. Attached is report on B-29 accident which occurred at Keesler Field, Mississippi, 27 November 1944.

2. Transmission of this report from this officer was considerably delayed due to, first, illness contracted while enroute to Keesler Field for a second visit in order to pick up pertinent information, and second, orders to return to home office before investigation was satisfactorily concluded in the field. The report was finished by means of telephone and mail.

3. It is believed that considerable study of the search and rescue problems involved in this accident and in similar accidents is valuable in light of the extensive over-water operations now being performed in the Pacific theater by B-29 aircraft. Such a survey may secure basis for improvement of equipment and technique. The loss of life in this case serves to point out that some improvement is probably desirable and that, if success is desired in cases where greater distances, fewer craft of all types, and danger from enemy action is present, existing technique and equipment may prove insufficient.

4. Following recommendations are made on the report:

- Coord. by
fig. 10.*
1. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies of strategically located fields near the route of flight, especially those with Sea Rescue equipment.
 2. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies used by search, crash, and patrol vessels in the area passed, and that coordination with such units be established so that pertinent information concerning the whereabouts and availability of such sea craft is available to crews participating in such missions.
 3. That the following equipment be made available to crews participating in overwater flight for attachment to the life belts:

One metal signaling mirror.
Two or more extra dye markers.
One metal whistle incorporating the best features available of sound distance, penetration of other noises, and volume of sound.
One waterproof flash lamp.

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COMMENT NO. 1 - continued -

4. That the following equipment be made available to crews of army flying boats:

One life preserver with rope attachment.

5. That the appropriate research division be contacted regarding possible design and use of the following:

A series of sea markers contained together in such a manner that the action of water on the enclosing substance (at a predetermined rate of dissolving) would liberate a sea marker at designated intervals. The advantage of such a device is that at time of bail out over water the container could be thrown out with attached parachute. Intermittent markers would indicate the direction of current to searchers and at the same time provide a series of markers extending over a considerable area enhancing the possibility of locating the general area containing the survivors.

5. To date no action has been taken on any recommendations. It is recommended that this office forward all approved recommendations through channels to the proper command for comment and action.

EUGENE W. RODDENBERRY
Captain, Air Corps
Regional Safety Officer.

1 Incl—
Accident Report w/attachments.

RESTRICTED

ACTION SHEET

RESTRICTEDO.P.S. Accident No. 45-11-7-2

Type of Aircraft B-29 Pilot Reynolds, Eugene Serial No. 42-24447
1st Lt.
 Date of Accident 27 Nov. 44 Place 37 miles south Damage Classification Major
Biloxi, Mississippi 1 Fatal
 Type Accident Fire & Explosion Fatalities 1 No. Injuries 7 Missing; 3 Minor;
1 None
 Contributing Factors 21 Other Crew Members; 30 Fuel System; 35 Propellers;

74 Safety Equipment

List of Recommendations by A.I.C. Personal Equipment Officers at Air Bases that
 clear airman for overwater missions should emphasize necessity to remove heavy
 flying clothing following parachute descent into water. Men should also be
 advised of prevailing ocean temperatures and that water soaked clothing does not
 give protection against coldness. Airmen stranded while floating on water should
 have brightly colored gasous balloon with approximately 20 feet of light twine
 fastened to shoulder straps to assist searchers to determine their location.
 Night water search would be facilitated if lost floating personnel had a small
 light extending from such a balloon as proposed in previous paragraph,
 or fastened on their foreheads.

List of Recommendations by R.S.O. See attached copies

Comments by Deputy Chief:

Action Taken:

Training and Operations See attached sheet**RESTRICTED**

45-11-7-2

Training and Operations (Cont'd)

RESTRICTED

Historical and Maintenance Medical Safety

Noted Old FF.

Chief of Regions

Noted

Accident and Analysis

Chief, OPS

RESTRICTED

4550-2110-10-75

B-29

M & M DIVISION MEMO

REVIEW OF ACCIDENT #45-11-27-2 DATE OF REVIEW 30 Jan 45

MATERIEL BRANCH

Comment:

ACTION TAKEN:

MAINTENANCE BRANCH

Comment: #1 Engine caught fire and dropped out of aircraft while over Gulf of Mexico. Cause unknown. Eleven crew members bailed out into Gulf. Three crew members rescued, remainder drown due to inability to remain afloat with heavy water logged flying equipment on. Fire ceased after engine dropped out and Pilot flew aircraft to Keesler Field.

ACTION TAKEN: R&R to T&O suggesting revision of PIF pertaining to parachute descents into water, concurring in RSO recommendations for provision of mirror, flashlight, ect. R&R with copy of RSO report to Region Ten for review and comment by ATSC.
See R6-4 attached.

R. J. F.

378125-4475

B-29 Accident Report #45-11-27-2, Bail out and loss of life in Gulf of Biloxi, Miss.

Safety Education
TMO: Training and Operations
Material and Maintenance Division

5 Feb 45

1
RST/mjn/33611/100

1. Your attention is invited to subject accident in which eight crew members drowned following parachute descent into Gulf a comparatively short distance off shore in spite of the attempts of twenty-two power boats and nine aircraft reaching the vicinity soon after the accident to locate and pick up crew.

2. The evidence indicates that searchers were unable to locate the crew members due to choppy water and that Mae West life belts do not provide sufficient buoyancy to support a person equipped with heavy water logged flight clothing. It is to be noted that the three survivors when picked up, had expended most of their energy in attempting to remain afloat and also that it was their belief that flight clothing would serve to keep them warmer in the water as against weighing them down.

3. The Pilot's Information File instructions on "Ditching", paragraph titled "General Crew Preparedness" page 8-3-2 states that flying boots should be removed but flying clothing and helmet kept on. Wherein the advice is good insofar as providing protection during the actual crash landing it is the opinion of this Division that the instructions both under "Ditching" and parachute landings in water (PIF page 8-4-6) should be augmented by further instructions to the effect that flying clothing offers no protection against cold in water and should be removed to facilitate remaining afloat when solely dependent on Mae West type life preservers. It is furthermore the opinion of this Division that Personal Equipment and Briefing Officers at air bases clearing airmen for overwater missions should emphasize the necessity of removing heavy flight clothing before making the jump into water or if time does not permit, to open slippers and prepare clothing for quick removal on reaching the water during descent.

4. Recommendations similar to those contained in paragraph 26 of Regional Safety Officer's Report have been submitted to AG/AS, OCAH, Emergency Rescue Branch through Flying Safety, Washington, D. C. as per attached copy of RSM dated 27 Jan 45.

EDWIN E. TURNER
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Chief, Material and Maintenance Division

1 Incl.
RSM dated 27 Jan 45 to AG/AS, OCAH,
Emergency Rescue Branch, thru
Flying Safety, Washington

R.J.F.

C O P Y

C O P Y

B-29 Aircraft - Life Saving Equipment for Overwater Bail-Outs.

AC/AS, OC&R, Emergency Rescue Branch
THRU: Flying Safety, Washington

27 Jan 45

1
LMR/cz/33611/118

Flying Safety, Winston-Salem

1. In view of recent instances where bail-out over water was considered more advisable than attempting a controlled ditching, overwater bail-out equipment has been surveyed and discussions held in the field by members of this office with Personal Equipment Officers, Directors of Training and pilots with overseas experience. All interviewed were in agreement that the one man life raft is greatly superior to the Mae West life belt in sustaining life on the water, but express doubt of the adequacy of the equipment included. This refers to the fact that very little additional chance is offered for signaling for assistance, since the only added device for that purpose is the Blue-Yellow Signal Panel.

2. On the basis of the above comment, it is recommended that the following equipment be provided on all one man life rafts in addition to that now available, under Specification No. AN-R-2a (C2):

a. Two (2) Extra Sea Markers - One marker will often be expended without attracting the attention of rescue craft. In a short period of time drift may well put miles between marker and survivor.

b. One (1) Signal Mirror, Type ESM/2 - With its range at least ten (10) miles, this signaling device would in many cases prove more effective than any other.

c. One (1) Signal Whistle - Survivors of a recent bail-out in the Gulf of Mexico report that surfcraft passed during the night at what appeared to be easy shouting distance, but these men could not make themselves heard. The range and penetrating quality of signals by whistle would help materially in such cases.

d. Five (5) Signal Flares (Waterproof) or One (1) Waterproof Flashlight - Flares of the type provided with the seven man raft are light in weight, easily ignited, burn for approximately five (5) minutes, and furnish glare brighter than that of a flashlight. It might be advisable, however, to substitute flashlights since flares would probably require special holders to protect raft and survivor from hot particles emitted from flares while burning and to protect flares from spray.

3. Request that this office be advised of action taken.

GEORGE C. PRICE
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Flying Safety

C O P Y

RESTRICTED

T&O ACCIDENT REVIEW

MODEL B-29
HOME STATION Great Bend, Kansas

DATE OF REVIEW 9 Feb 45

ACCIDENT NO. 45-11-27-2

JWR/jpm/33611-45

TRAINING BRANCH:

Comment - No comments.

Action Taken - All recommendations forwarded to AC/AS O&R
Emergency Rescue Branch per copy of R&R attached.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

OPERATIONS BRANCH:

Comment -

Action Taken -

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

WHL
WALTER H. CASEY

RESTRICT

1st Col Air Corps
Chief, Training and Operations Division
7/12/50-10-95

RESTRICTED

Crashing of Flight B-29 Crew Members in Gulf of Mexico

TYPE
SOURCE
FROM:AC/AS GCSB, Emergency Rescue Branch
IN 3322 (1) Flying Safety (Washington)
(2) AC/AS Training
Flying Safety (Training and Operations Division,
Winston-Salem)

8 Feb 45

1

JSS/30/33611-45

1. Your attention is invited to the attached Regional Safety Officer's Report of Aircraft Accident Investigation and the Statement of Escalier Field Accident Officer RE B-29 Accident, 27 Nov 44.

2. The heavy loss of life in this accident, in spite of the fact that successful parachute descents were made only a short distance off shore and 22 power boats and 9 aircraft reached the scene promptly, indicates the need for further action in preparation of crews for possible parachute descents into water and for better rescue equipment and better coordination between aircraft and air-sea rescue agencies.

3. Quite a number of recommendations are included in the inclosures attached hereto, and it is felt that each deserves careful consideration. The following additional recommendations were made by the Accident Investigating Board on the Form 14:

a. Personnel Equipment Officers at Air Bases that clear airmen for overwater missions should emphasize necessity to remove heavy flying clothing following parachute descent into water. Men should also be advised of prevailing ocean temperatures and that water soaked clothing does not give protection against coldness.

b. Airmen stranded while floating on water should have brightly colored gasous balloons with approximately 20 feet of light line fastened to shoulder straps to assist searchers to determine their location.

c. Night water search would be facilitated if lost floating personnel had a small light extending from such a balloon as proposed in previous paragraph or fastened on their foreheads.

d. With reference to the recommendation regarding removal of heavy flying clothing, it is suggested that a decision be based on adequate tests. There appears to be some advantage in retaining heavy flying clothing for a short while after landing in the water because it provides considerable initial buoyancy. The question of whether it continues to provide warmth after becoming saturated should be carefully investigated.

5. It is requested that any revised instructions developed as a result of such investigation be forwarded to this office as promptly as possible for inclusion in the Pilots' Information File.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Drowning of Eight B-27 Crew Members in Gulf of Mexico

TDSW
XXXXXX
FROM: AC/AS OCSB, Emergency Rescue Branch
IN TDSW (1) Flying Safety (Washington)
(2) AC/AS Training
Flying Safety (Training and Operations Division,
Winston-Salem)

8 Feb 45

1 (Cont'd)
JWS/jps/13611-45

5. It is further requested that this office be advised of the action taken on each of the recommendations made by the Accident Investigating Board and those in the inclosures attached hereto.

- 2 Incls.
Incl 1 - Cy 880's rpt of a/c
acc investigation
20 Dec 44
Incl 2 - Statement of Kessler
Fld Acc Officer MS B-27
Acc 27 Nov 44

HORACE J. REID
Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Chief, Flying Safety

RESTRICTED

STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR (PIL)

I, 1st Lt. Eugene W. Hammond, ASN O-726639, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, acted as airplane commander on B-29, #447, Crew #35.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1715 cwt we had just made a bomb run on Freemason Island, crossed the target, and had flown for approximately five minutes in a southerly direction. The engine instruments and engines seemed to be functioning properly, when the left gunner reported smoke coming from #1 engine. I observed the engine and fire was coming out from around the cowlings and I told my Co-Pilot, 2nd Lt. E. H. Gresham, to prepare the crew for abandonment. While he was doing this, I attempted to feather the #1 engine and had the engineer carry out his fire procedure. The engine did not feather and the engineer used both engine fire extinguishers on the #1 engine to no avail. I ordered the bombardier, 1st Lt. Fred Bigelow, to salvo bombs and bomb bay tanks. I then told Lt. Gresham to check that all crew members had their Mae Wests on. At that time I observed that the fire was uncontrollable and was burning around the entire area and spreading over the left wing. I then ordered the crew to abandon ship.

As the crew started abandonment, the plane started a tight spiro to the left. I managed to gain control of the plane while the rest of the crew bailed out. I circled and saw approximately ten opened chutes. I was about to abandon the aircraft when the #1 engine fell out of its mount and the plane became controllable. The action seemed to extinguish the fire. I then trimmed the aircraft and set it on Auto-Pilot. I immediately got the radio facility chart and moved into the Co-Pilot seat, and tuned in Keesler Tower, and then returned to my original seat and called Keesler Tower on the Command, giving the emergency condition and approximate location of the accident. I requested the emergency landing instructions and proceeded to complete a normal landing on Runway #31. My bomb bay doors were opened during the landing.

After landing I taxied to a stop on the apron and my flaps were still in a down position because the auxiliary power unit was inoperative. I set my parking brakes and started to move into the engineer's position, for the purpose of cutting the engines. At that time M/Sgt. Danley of Keesler Field entered the plane through the nose wheel well and cut the engines for me. I got out of the plane and was met by Lt. Col. Stoffer and proceeded to relate what had happened.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.

Eugene W. Hammond
1st Lt. Eugene W. Hammond
ASN O-726639

Incl 2

727 -11

STATEMENT OF KEESLER FIELD ACCIDENT OFFICER
RE B-29 ACCIDENT, 27 NOV. 1944

At 1717C, 27 November 1944, the undersigned was on duty in the Operations Office at this station when the Control Tower called thru the intercom that airplane 447 had been on fire, that the crew had bailed out 15 miles southwest of Freemason Island, and that the plane was going to attempt an emergency landing at this station. The Tower was ordered to broadcast blind to all Keesler Field OA-10 aircraft that an emergency existed and to proceed to the point mentioned by the Pilot of the disabled plane. The undersigned ordered the Keesler Field crash procedure, both on the airdrome and over the water, effected and went down to the apron to observe the landing attempt.

The B-29 was then about three (3) miles distant, at 2000 feet, wheels down, and descending vertically approximately 1000 feet per minute, altho it appeared to be in a normal flying attitude. The runway approach to the NW at this station is a difficult one on account of 65 ft. trees on both ends as it gives the appearance of being about 4000 feet. The undersigned noted the #1 Engine nacelle missing when the plane was about 200', and the Pilot accomplished a landing slightly hard but not abnormal on the first third of the runway. The Pilot completed his landing roll at about 3500', proceeded ahead to a cut-off strip, then backed on the apron to a spot that the undersigned had recommended. The Tower logged the landing at 1730, just fourteen (14) minutes after the emergency radio call. It was noted that the plane had landed with both bomb bay doors open and full flaps, and only the Pilot was visible.

The Keesler Field Line Chief, M/Sgt. Danley, immediately climbed up into the cockpit where the Pilot was setting his brakes so that he could go to the engineer compartment to shut down the remaining three engines. The engine cowl flaps were in trail position, and considerable fire was coming from #3 Engine exhaust. M/Sgt. Danley stated that he cut off the engines at the Pilot's request, and the undersigned requested the Pilot to come into the Hangar in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the accident.

The Pilot stated that he was flying approximately four (4) minutes past Freemason Island on a southerly heading when he heard the right scanner call the engineer to inform him that heavy black smoke was pouring out of the bottom of #1 Engine. The Pilot stated that he immediately turned to observe same and when he did, the whole nacelle was in flames. He immediately closed the throttle on that engine and attempted to feather the prop, which was ineffective. He ordered the engineer to accomplish emergency procedure and ordered the Co-pilot to alert and check the crew for emergency procedure over-water. He ordered the Bombardier to jettison the bomb bay fuel tanks and bombs. When both fire bottles leading into the #1 nacelle had been expended without having any effect on the fire, he headed the plane toward the west which appeared to be the nearest shore point. The plane had descended from 12,000 to 10,000 feet up to this point.

Incl. 3

727 -12-

He next ordered the crew to abandon ship, which was becoming unmanageable, and went into a sharp left spiral while on "automatic", after several men had bailed out. He disengaged the "automatic" and righted the plane manually in order that the rest of his crew could abandon ship, which they did. He stated that just as he was preparing to leave, he glanced at #1 engine and noted that it had torn itself free from the ship and that the fire had suddenly extinguished itself. He then circled the descending airmen and noted about ten descending parachutes. He then changed over to the Co-Pilot's seat in order to tune his radio compass in on this station, as he was not certain of the general location. After referring to his facility chart, he changed back to the left seat and called the Keesler Tower, informing him of his fire, and also of his intentions to attempt an emergency landing. The Tower in acknowledging the call advised him that the winds favored a landing to the NW and that the runway was reserved for his landing.

The undersigned had the plane searched for parachutes and life vests while the Pilot was talking, and received a report that two (2) chest pack chutes and one (1) back pack chute and one (1) Mae Vest were onboard the plane, the Mae Vest and back pack belonging to the Pilot; and a later check of the briefing questionnaire revealed that two spare chutes were stowed on the airplane.

The Pilot appeared calm and deliberate and certain in recalling what occurred during the emergency.

By 1740C help had been requested from the following agencies for assistance in rescuing the eleven (11) airmen who descended into the waters on the Chandeleur Sound about thirty-five (35) miles south of this station: U. S. Coast Guard, Biloxi; Marine Base; Emergency Rescue School; and the Gulfport Army Air Field. The request asked that all available water-and air- craft be dispatched to the above vicinity and report progress by radio to this station. The Gulfport Army Air Field had listened to the radio conversation and advised that a rescue boat was 1½ miles from Freemason Island and an attempt was being made to establish contact, which was made at 1745C.

The official time of sundown in this locality was 1744 CWT for that date, and at 1750 an OA-10A from this station advised the Tower that two planes were preparing to descend into the water in an effort to rescue an airman who had been sighted near a dye marker. At 1810 the Pilot radioed that he had picked up a partially unconscious man and was proceeding to this station, and that darkness had occurred in that area. The two OA-10As had been returning from a navigation mission when the dye marker was observed, and the rescued man was partially unconscious and unable to inform them until the plane arrived at this station that a number of men had bailed out in that area. The undersigned talked to the airman, who was identified as Cpl. Ned C. Johnson, the right scanner, and he stated that he saw only two (2) parachutes besides his own descend into the water. He was admitted to the hospital along with F/O Thomas L. Stanley, Jr. of the OA-10, who dove into the water to assist in Johnson's rescue after he became entangled and dragged under the water with a rescue rope.

While the above plane was enroute to this station, the Navigator was questioned as to the exact location of the rescue, and he stated that it was accomplished at 29° 53' north and 89° 03' west and that he estimated the waves at four (4) feet high and the wind from 15° at eight (8) MPH. The above information was immediately transmitted to all agencies engaged in the search. The above location was fourteen (14) miles north of where the Pilot estimated that his crew bailed out and the search was centered from the new location.

No further essential information was received from the search area, where it was estimated that thirteen crash boats were combing the waters and were aided by flares dropped by Second Air Force B-17s from Gulfport. Shortly after midnite at 0030G the Biloxi Coast Guard surface craft CG-63044 radioed to its Base that it had rescued Lt. Bigelow, the navigator, and Cpl. Jones, the left scunner, and was proceeding to the Biloxi Municipal Pier. Lt. Bigelow was reported as being in good shape, and Cpl. Jones very weak; and necessary medical arrangements were made to take care of the men at Keesler Hospital. Lt. Bigelow later informed the undersigned that he had counted eleven (11) chutes descending and that he believed he was only a mile and one-half (1½ miles) from the OA-10s that had landed in the water. The last men were rescued at a position of 29°, 43 minutes and 30 seconds north, and 89° and 3 minutes west. A re-check with the crew of the OA-10 which made the first rescue revealed that the navigator had made a miscalculation and was in error regarding the first position reported, and that the men had descended in the approximate position of where the Pilot had originally stated that he thought they had.

The following rescue boats were engaged thruout the night up to this period:

<u>Keesler Field</u>	<u>Gulfport AAF</u>	<u>Emergency Rescue School Keesler Field</u>	<u>Biloxi Coast Guard</u>
P-263 (83 ft.)	P-728 (63')	P-442 (85')	CG-63044
P-455 (45 ft.)	P-70 (83')	P-593 (85')	CG-63058
P-51 (42')	P-248 (83')	P-632 (63')	
	P-77 (a tug)	P-677 (63')	

The above boats were augmented before daybreak by the following boats, which were in or enroute to the area: 3 - 85' and 3 - 63', and 1 - 45' from the Emergency Rescue School, and 2 - shallow draft (24') from the Keesler Field Boat Company, making a total of 22 surface craft. It is estimated that nine (9) aircraft also reached the scene before darkness had set in the night before.

At daybreak a total of 75 aircraft and one blimp engaged in the air search over the area. The aircraft came from the following bases:

Keesler Field - 21, including 6 amphibious
 Biloxi Coast Guard - 3 amphibious
 Gulfport AAF - 30 B-17s
 Pensacola Naval Air Station - 5 PBXs
 San Marco (Tex.) AAF - 16 planes
 Houma (La.) Naval Air Station - 1 blimp. (2nd Day - 2 blimps).

The San Marcos flight arrived at this station on a navigation mission at mid-nite and were especially equipped for an over-water return flight. Permission was obtained from the Commanding Officer of that station to utilize their services in the search.

The area immediately to the south was patrolled by a fleet of forty-seven (47) powered boats who were engaged in shrimp fishing. These boats are spread out and they cover an area of over sixty square miles daily in their trawling. Radio Station WGM Gulfport makes periodic weather and market information broadcasts to these boats who stay out five or six days at a time. The above station stated that following a request from the undersigned the news of the missing airmen was transmitted to the above boats along with a request that they keep a sharp lookout for survivors and bodies.

The weather turned bad two hours after daylight the morning following the accident, and the Commanding Officer, Keesler Field ordered all aircraft except four (4) OA-10s from the scene when visibility dropped down to one mile with heavy showers prevailing. The OA-10s conducted their operations below 200 foot altitude. All craft were dispatched thruout the day when visibility permitted and altitude separation and left turns were established for each type of aircraft. The surface craft search procedure was coordinated under the direction of Maj. Eliason, Director of Marine Training, Emergency Rescue School, Keesler Field.

At 1357C of the second day the ERS crash boat P-630, commanded by 2nd Lt. Harold Eaton, recovered a body, later identified as 2nd Lt. James C. Clark, Navigator. The recovery was made two (2) miles south of the position where Lt. Bigelow and Cpl. Jones were picked up twelve (12) hours previous. Lt. Eaton's log indicates the body was found at 29° 43 mins. N and 89° 13 mins. W in a partially submerged attitude. His flying boots were still on and the autopsy revealed that his lungs were full of water and his death was due to drowning and probable exhaustion.

The search continued until 1000C, December 2, when it became evident that the chances of survival had expired. Routine searches are still conducted daily (10 December), and will be conducted until 27 December 1944. These searches are part of the Emergency Rescue School training OA-10s and rescue boats who have daily missions into the area where it is believed bodies might be recovered.

The following details are recorded with a view of preventing delays in responding to emergency situations overwater and to preventing loss of life:

1. The three airmen who were rescued from the Gulf had expended most of their energy trying to remain afloat with heavy water logged flying clothing. They all stated that they believed it kept them warmer and did not realize it weighted them down. They did not realize that the Gulf waters were temperate enough to overcome immediate possibility of exposure.

ATT: PERSONAL
EQUIP. OFFICERS

2. The above airmen state that rescue boats passed within one hundred (100) yards of them on several occasions and the sound of the engines drowned out their shouts for help. The men stated that they believe they could have attracted attention had they possessed whistles.

ATT: PERSONAL
EQUIP. OFFICERS

3. There is no record that the radio operator broadcast an emergency warning when the fire occurred. The Second Air Force briefing folder for the Batista plan mission does not indicate the Keesler or Gulfport AAF radio frequencies plus Air-Sea Rescue facilities which are available in this area. It is believed that the above planned mission passes directly over this area, as there have been four (4) emergency descents on Keesler Field alone in forty (40) days by Second Air Force aircraft on similar missions.

ATT: COMMUNICA-
TIONS

4. There does not appear to be complete coordination between the Second and Third Air Forces who share joint use of the Freemason Island Danger Zone. The B-29 Pilot was unaware that a Gulfport AAF 63 ft. crash boat was 1½ miles west of Freemason Island during the period he was bombing his target. The Bombardier, Lt. Bigelow, when questioned by the undersigned stated that he saw the boat but did not attach enough significance to its presence to inform the Pilot until after the crew had been ordered to bail out.

ATT: Operations
& Training

5. The undersigned recommends that the following equipment be procured for the benefit of airmen who engage in overwater missions: a deflated (weather obs. type) balloon, a cartridge of helium to inflate same, and 20 ft. light twine in order to fasten one end on shoulder harness. A wicker type of light cord with a metallic protector and an automatic lighter would also provide a light marker to be fastened to the above balloon to aid surface craft in searching for stranded floating airmen during hours of darkness.

ATT: Pers. Equipment
and Research

6. The following items are listed as having a possible bearing on the fire which occurred in the #1 Engine nacelle:

a. An analysis of the Engine Operation Record maintained by the Engineer in flight and other notations indicate that he estimated that the plane consumed approximately 1000 gallons less than the original flight plan in the first four hours. His figures at 1704G, eight minutes prior to the fire do not indicate a continued saving, altho power and RPM have been lessened to from 33 to 31.5 in. and 2200 to 2100 RPM, and mixture had been changed from Rich to Lean (Auto). Such

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-16-

loss could have been created by a rupture of the fuel line, in the forward part of the nacelle which may have been ignited by exhaust gases.

- b. The right lower section appears to have received the most intense heat in the section near the fuel line. Such a continued leak might account for the failure of the fire extinguisher to quench the flames.
- c. The fire burned thru the upper section of the nacelle which permitted the engine to drop and tear loose by its own weight. Lt. Bigelow, one of the last men to jump, noticed an object fall which he first believed to be an airman whose chute was inoperative. After counting the descending airmen and observing the B-29 continue in controlled flight, he believes the object was the falling engine.

NOTE:

An informal meeting has been called to convene 12 December 1944 at the Biloxi Coast Guard Station by the Commandant, 8th Naval District to coordinate a joint Air-Sea Rescue plan for this area. Representatives from Keesler Field, Gulfport AAF and the Biloxi Coast Guard Air Station will discuss a comprehensive plan by which the joint facilities may be speedily activated to assist in emergencies. It is believed that all activities can be coordinated from a single control station by the agency which assumes jurisdiction of the emergency.

All military activities who conduct operations in this area will be notified when such plan is approved.

Charles T. Stopper
CHARLES T. STOPPER,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Station Accident Officer
Keesler Field, Miss.
10 December 1944.

-end-
727
-17-

RESTRICTED

STATEMENTS OF SURVIVORS

727

-18-

Incl 5

STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR

I, 1st Lt. Fred H. Bigelow, ASN O-725047, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, am a Bombardier on B-29 #447, Crew #35.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1715 cwt at a point about fifteen miles west of Freemason Island, at an altitude of 12,000 feet, the left gunner reported smoke in #1 engine. I was in my position and turned and looked towards that direction, noticing a large fire on top of #1 engine cowl. The Pilot ordered me to salvo my bombs and bomb bay tanks. The Pilot then ordered the crew to prepare to abandon ship. I attached my Mae West and parachute, and on signal proceeded to the forward bomb bay.

When the signal was given to bail out I jumped and was the seventh person to leave the plane. When my parachute opened, I turned and looked towards the aircraft, which was completing a slow circle to the left. I distinctly counted eleven parachutes open, including my own. While counting the chutes, I noticed a black object which I assume to be the #1 engine falling to the sea. I did not see it hit.

I observed an island off about five miles to the west. Upon landing in the water I disconnected the chest pack from the harness and inflated my Mae West, and then proceeded to swim towards the island. After about thirty minutes I noticed three PBV aircraft circle the scene of the accident searching for survivors. A B-24 which had joined the search evidently saw my sea marker dye and circled my position for approximately thirty minutes. The PBVs were unable to locate me. As dusk fell I still kept swimming towards the island. After about three hours, a surface craft passed approximately 150 yards from me but failed to hear my shouts.

About one hour later, after repeated calls, I located Cpl. Jones. He and I joined company and took turns keeping each other afloat. We noticed several aircraft at approximately 1,000 feet. They were dropping flares about five miles from us. We then saw a surface craft approaching and I waited until it was in hailing distance at which time I shouted and flailed my arms, creating a spray in order to attract their attention. They picked us up about 0030 28 November 1944 and administered excellent First Aid treatment. Upon docking we were brought to the hospital at Keesler Field.

I would recommend that in the future all Mae Wests be equipped with at least two packages of sea marker dyes and a water-proof light.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.

Fred H. Bigelow
1st Lt. Fred H. Bigelow
ASN O-725047

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STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR

I, Corporal William K. Jones, ASN 14202825, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, am the left Waist Gunner on B-29 #447, Crew #35. I have served as gunner on this crew since 6 July 1944.

At approximately 1715 cwt on 27 November 1944 I observed smoke coming from #1 engine, and I tried to contact the pilot but my intercom was inoperative so I had Cpl. Johnson, the right Waist Gunner, notify the pilot. At that time the #1 engine burst into flames and I heard the emergency alarm bell, which rang three times, which was the signal to prepare to abandon ship. I then proceeded to my bail out station, which is the rear entrance door, and waited for the signal to abandon ship. I then heard the bail out alarm and proceeded to jump out through the rear entrance door. I was the fourth to leave the ship.

When my parachute opened I tried to maneuver into a position close to the other three men who had already bailed out. I looked around on descending and counted eleven parachutes open, including my own. Upon landing in the water I loosened my leg straps and chest straps and inflated my Mae West. After freeing myself of the parachute I started swimming towards a small island approximately three to five miles away. Several searching planes were flying overhead at approximately 1000 feet, but I was unable to attract their attention. Several surface crafts were in the area but also were unable to locate me.

About 11:30 P.M. Lt. Bigelow and I, by shouts, attracted each other's attention and swam towards each other. We met and took turns keeping each other afloat. Approximately 0030, 28 November 1944 we were picked up by a Coast Guard search boat, and they immediately administered First Aid. We were then taken to shore and at that point taken to the hospital on Keesler Field.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.

William K. Jones
Cpl. William K. Jones
ASN 14202825

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STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR

I, Cpl. Ned C. Johnson, ASN 37224492, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, am the right waist gunner on B-29 #447, Crew #35. I have served as gunner on this crew since 6 July 1944.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1715 cwt I was in my position in the right blister when the left gunner, Cpl. Jones, whose interphone was inoperative, exclaimed "Pl is smoking heavily". I immediately called the Pilot, Lt. Hammond, giving him the message and in a few seconds time heard the Co-Pilot giving the command over the interphone to prepare to abandon ship. The left gunner grabbed his parachute and went to the rear entrance door. At this time I assisted the Ringsight Gunner, Pfc. Little, into snapping his chest chute on. The Ringsight Gunner fastened my leg straps to my back pack. While we were preparing the alarm bell was audibly ringing in short rings, which is the signal to prepare for bail out. As near as I could ascertain, the left gunner, radar operator, and the tail gunner were standing by at the rear entrance door. Then the signal came to bail out and Pfc. Little bailed out through the rear bomb-bay. I followed immediately and was the second to go out through this exit.

My parachute opened with a slight jolt and I looked up and saw the canopy pull open. I was facing due south, and looked up and observed to the left and the rear one open chute and to the right and the front one open chute. Those were the only chutes I observed. Shortly before landing in the water I endeavored to unfasten my leg straps but was unsuccessful because of my bulky clothing. Upon landing in the water I completely submerged and while submerged unfastened the two leg straps and the chest strap. I immediately bobbed to the surface and treaded water until I freed myself of the shroud lines. I then inflated my Mae West and held onto the chute with my left hand, and started swimming in a northerly direction.


I had been in the water approximately forty-five minutes when I had to let go of the chute. Immediately thereafter I sighted two PBV aircraft circling nearer and nearer from the south. I waited until they were near at which time I released the sea marker from my Mae West. The marker spread into somewhat of a circle, approximately forty feet in diameter. Both ships circled at a low altitude and dipped their wings, probably to acknowledge that they had seen me. Immediately one PBV landed about 2000 yards to my left. I assumed they were picking up the man whom I had seen at my left while descending. This plane then took off and joined the other PBV. They both circled again and again. The second PBV landed about 200 yards in front of me and taxied to my location. While he was maneuvering to get closer to me the other PBV, which had previously landed, landed the second time, this time about 400 yards in front of me. On the third attempt to throw me a line, which appeared to be a double rope, I finally grabbed hold of the line but immediately the plane started taxiing, and the sudden force pulled the rope from

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my grip and my left foot became entangled in a loop at the end of the rope. The plane continued to taxi and I was dragged under water until I finally lost consciousness. When I regained consciousness I was lying on a bunk in the PEY. Later I found out that a Flight Officer with the Rescue Crew had dived into the water and floated me with the assistance of the other man inside the plane. The crew removed my clothing and administered excellent First Aid treatment. The plane then took off and landed at Keesler Field at which time I was removed to the hospital.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.


Cpl. Ned C. Johnson
ASN 37224496

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RESTRICTED

STATEMENTS OF RESCUE PERSONNEL

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Incl 6

STATEMENT OF PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN SEARCH

I, Lt. Aaron S. Wolfson, ASN O-713921, assigned to the Co-Pilot Branch stationed at Keesler Field, Mississippi, am a co-pilot instructor on B-24 aircraft. I have served in this capacity for the past six months and was previously graduated from B-24 Transition School at Liberal, Kansas.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1730 hours, I was circling Keesler Field at 5000 feet in B-24 42-52130, when, by reason of radio conversation, I found out that a B-29 aircraft was in distress. Shortly thereafter, the tower broadcast a call for all B-24 aircraft flying out of Keesler Field to stand by to engage in a search mission. I acknowledged the call and kept circling. Shortly afterward I saw a B-29 land on Runway #31. After a lapse of approximately five or ten minutes the tower gave me the approximate position of the bail out, and directions as to how to get there. They also inquired as to whether or not I had life rafts on board and, upon receiving an affirmative reply, they dispatched me on the search.

As I reached the approximate location, I saw two PBY's land on the water to pick up a survivor. Using this location as a starting point, I began a parallel search, using five minute east-west legs and turning one minute south. Shortly before sunset I located five sea marker dyes approximately halfway between Point Chico and Old Harbor Island at about the southernmost point of Chandeleur Island. Three of the marker dye spots were in almost a straight north to south line, about 500 yards apart. The other two were about a half mile further south in a northeast, southwest line. I was unable to see any men in the water. After making two 360° circles around the sea marker spots, it had become dark. I turned on my landing lights, continued circling and began trying to contact Keesler Tower. I was unsuccessful in this attempt on both Command and Liaison transmitter on frequencies 4495, 6210 and 3105. There was no other radio installed on the aircraft. The aircraft was not equipped with pyrotechnic devices nor were the life rafts accessible from within the plane. I broadcast blindly to other aircraft in the vicinity to no avail. I located a crash boat and tried blinking a coded SOS with first the recognition and then the landing lights. I received no response.

I then headed the aircraft for Keesler Field and kept, unsuccessfully, trying to establish contact with the tower. Immediately

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Statement of Personnel Engaged in Search

upon landing, I went into the Base Operations Office and reported to Major Prim, of the ERS. I pointed out the location and number of the sea marker dyes to him on a map.

I have read the above and to the best of my knowledge it is a true statement of what I saw and did.

Aaron S. Wolfson
AARON S. WOLFSON,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
ASN O-718921

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HEADQUARTERS
A.A.F. EMERGENCY RESCUE SCHOOL
KEESLER FIELD, MISSISSIPPI

S T A T E M E N T

4 December 1944.

I, 2nd Lt. ROSS D. FRAKER, O-813496, am assigned to the Flying Training Section of the Emergency Rescue School, Keesler Field, Mississippi as a flying instructor. I have been assigned to the Emergency Rescue School as an instructor since March of this year.

On 27 November, 1944, I left Keesler Field at about 1400, C.W.T. with a student crew including pilot and co-pilot in OA-10 #343842, for a practice rendezvous mission. Three OA-10 airplanes were to fly at assigned headings for 1 hour and 30 minutes and at that time to turn to rendezvous point at Breton Island in the Delta Area of the Gulf of Mexico. The three ships met at Breton Island at about 1720 C.W.T. and took up the course to Keesler Field at about 1725. My ship, 343842, departed the island at about 1727 by the navigator's log, with 343845 flying formation on right wing to me. The third ship departed singly a few minutes prior in the direction of Keesler Field.

At about 1745, C.W.T., by the navigator's log, the radar technician of the student crew, Cpl. Charles C. Raschiatore called the pilot on interphone and reported a spot of green sea marker in the water almost below us. We were flying at about an altitude of 600 feet. We immediately circled down and to the left and could see some object in the water about 100 feet to the north of the sea marker. We circled again and lower and observed that the object was a man in a rubber life jacket who waved recognition to us. As we circled to land, we temporarily lost the man to view, so came in over him again. The condition of the sea being 4 to 5 foot swells with occasional white caps and the sun being just above the horizon, made it very difficult to keep the man in sight. We made the second low run over the man, and knowing that we could not keep him in sight while on a landing run, I landed as close to the man as I could judge the turns. When on the water, we could not see the man and began to taxi in the direction we thought him to be. The second OA-10 circled the man and dipped over him to give us his position. We began to taxi to the indicated position when I noticed that our ship was taking on a great deal of water in the forward section. Because of the considerable amount of water coming into the ship, and not being certain where it was coming in, I immediately applied power and took off. Finding that the water was coming in the forward gun blister, I temporarily covered the leak and made ready to land again. The OA-10 that was circling did not know our difficulty, and landed near the man after we had taken off. He was some distance from the man in the water, and as we had the man in sight, and were very low and at just the right angle to keep the man in sight and land very close to him, we thought that we could get to him quicker than the ship already in the water, as we did not know

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whether or not he had the man in sight. We immediately landed and taxied directly to the man and threw him a line. The first attempt, he failed to receive the line and we made a tight circle and this time passed the line to him. The man either accidentally or intentionally fastened the line to his leg and as we still had some forward motion, the man was temporarily pulled under the surface. The student co-pilot, who had been in the blister of the OA-10, then went into the water to assist the man on the rope in anyway that he could. By this time, I had reached the blister of the ship, and the student pilot had stopped our engines. We succeeded in getting the man aboard. He was very cold and frightened and unable to speak clearly. His wet clothing was removed and dry clothing put on him and the aldis lamp used to help warm him. We were unable to find out from him for several minutes who he was, or how he happened to be in the water.

While we were preparing to rescue this man, members of our crew had reported at least one and probably two more spots of marker dye in this vicinity. They were unable to see anyone in the water near them, however. It is possible that intership communication with our wing ship been available, we could have remained on the water and by his direction from the air, investigated closely at least one of the spots of dye before absolute darkness. However, our take-off from the rough water in absolute darkness would have been hazardous. Assuming that our wing ship would circle the position until we could contact assistance, we headed for Keesler Field.

Shortly after leaving the position, we saw a B-24 coming to the area and a few minutes later, a crash boat going in that direction. We did not contact the B-24 or the crash boat.

We landed at Keesler Field and turned the man over to medical authorities and the circumstances were immediately reported to the Base Operations Officer.

Richard E. Hathaway
RICHARD E. HATHAWAY,
Captain, Air Corps,
Witness.

Ross D. Fraker
ROSS D. FRAKER,
2nd Lt., Air Corps.

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
HEADQUARTERS
AAF EMERGENCY RESCUE SCHOOL
KEESLER FIELD, MISSISSIPPI

8 December 1944

S T A T E M E N T

I, JAMES F. LUCKETT, F/O, Air Corps, was riding in capacity of co-pilot on ship #842 when a green sea marker was sighted. I was in the blister at the time because the instructor pilot was at the controls.

After we made the water landing to pick the man a rope was thrown out the blister. Somehow he tangled the rope on his left ankle and due to the speed of the plane at the moment was dragged under the water about 100 yards. On sighting him again I saw he was under the water slightly and head down. I jumped from the blister and held him above until we were able to get him in the blister. Due to his condition we were unable to find out if he was the only one out there or not. This being so we proceeded back to the home base, Keesler Field, Miss. and he was turned over to the Medical Dept.


JAMES F. LUCKETT,
F/O., Air Corps,
Student Pilot.

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REPORT OF RESCUE

On November 21, 1944, at 1728 hours, plane No. 842 piloted by Lt. Donald G. Rynne and navigated by me, P/O Thomas L. Stanley, Jr., proceeded from Briton Island on a course of 011°. At 1745 hours a message was sent to the pilot from Sgt. Isidor E. Barrack stating that green sea marker had been sighted. Upon receipt of this message Lt. Rynne turned and flew low over the marker and found that a man clad in flying clothing was in the water.

Lt. Fraker, the instructor pilot, took over and landed but lost the marker during the landing. The water was choppy, making it impossible to find the sea marker while on the water. We took off again, located the sea marker and landed. When the plane reached the man, Lt. Rynne made tight circles around him while the enlisted men in the after section threw out a rope. On the third turn around, the man caught the rope. Due to the speed of the plane and the manner in which the rope was entangled around the man, he was pulled under water for some distance. When it appeared as though the plane would not stop at once I started pulling the man in. With the help of other crew members, the man was lifted into the blister. His wet clothing was replaced with dry clothing.

We took off from the water at 1810 and headed for Keesler Field.

From Briton Island to the scene of the rescue we were making a track good of 011°, a true air speed of 97 knots and a ground speed of 88 knots. The wind was from 015° at 8 knots. All of the computations were made on this basis. At the time of the rescue we were seventeen minutes out from Briton Island. At a speed of 88 knots this would make the position of rescue 25 miles from Briton Island on a course of 011°. Coordinates 29°53' N 89°03' W.

Upon arriving at Keesler Field the coordinates of the place of rescue were given to Lt. Col. Stoffer, the base operations Officer.

Thomas L. Stanley, Jr.
Thomas L. Stanley, Jr.,
P/O A.C.

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NCG 2628
(June 1940)

REPORT OF ASSISTANCE

Unit BAS, Biloxi, Miss Particular activity CG-63-44 (AVR-6) District Eighth Naval Serial No. 7-45
November 27, 1944
(Date of casualty)

Other units assisting <u>Army Crash Boats</u>	*SOURCE-0	*NATURE-1
<u>and planes</u>	*DEGREE-2	*EQUIPMENT-3
Vessel assisted <u>Crew of aircraft</u>	Nationality	(4)
Home port <u>Great Bend, Kansas</u>	Rig	(5)
Cargo <u>Military</u>	Class	(6)
Bound from <u>Great Bend, Kansas</u>	Tonnage	(7)
To <u>Cuba</u> Days out	*Classification of assistance (major or miscellaneous)	(8)
Names and addresses of—	Persons on board:	
Master	Crew <u>12 men (Army)</u>	(901)
Owner <u>U. S. Army</u>	Passengers	(902)
Casualty:	Persons actually saved from drowning:	
Nature <u>Parachute jump</u>	Crew <u>2 men (Army)</u>	(1001)
Cause <u>Engine failure</u> (See footnote 6)	Passengers	(1002)
Time and source of first information <u>By phone</u>	Persons rescued from positions of peril:	
<u>from Biloxi Air Station 1800R</u>	Crew <u>Some (Army)</u>	(1101)
Time district commander was notified	Passengers	(1102)
Date and hour proceeded <u>11-27-44, 1823R</u>	Persons lost:	
Arrived <u>0005R/ 28th</u> Distance <u>53 miles</u>	Crew <u>9 men (Army)</u>	(1201)
Where found <u>Chicot Point Light</u> (Local name)	Passengers	(1202)
Lat. <u>29°44' N</u> Long. <u>89°12'30" W</u>	Coast Guard crew:	
Was vessel in danger of extensive damage or loss?	Injured <u>None</u>	(1301)
Weather:	Lost	(1302)
Wind <u>NE 2</u> Sea <u>(2) NE</u>	Value of property involved:	
Temperature <u>56 F</u> Visibility <u>3</u>	Vessel	\$ <u>None</u> (1401)
Equipment used:	Cargo	\$ <u>None</u> (1402)
Boats <u>CG-63044 AVR-6</u>	Value of property lost:	
Search lite and R.T/C.W.	Vessel	\$ <u>No</u> (1501)
Searchlight <u>3 red parachute flares</u>	Cargo	\$ (1502)
Vehicle <u>None</u>	Persons succored	(1601)
Ordnance <u>None</u>	Persons resuscitated <u>One man</u>	(1702)
Other <u>Life nets and buoys</u>	Miles towed <u>None</u>	(1904)
	Coast Guard property damaged (description):	
	<u>None</u>	
	Value	\$ (2005)

*This line is to be filled in by headquarters.

10-5170-1 30

Was service equipment satisfactory? Yes If not, make full report and recommendation for improvement in a separate communication.

REMARKS

Rescued two Army men from Chandeleur Sound, 3 miles 73° P.S.C. off Chicot Point Light after being in water for six hours.

- (1) Names of men, 1st Lt. Bigelow, Fred H., Service No. 0725042, Army Air Force, Great Bend, Kansas, taken aboard 0015R with mild state of shock, after being in water for six hours. At 0200, resting well.
- (2) Jones, William E., Service No. 14202825, Corporal, Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas. Exposure with shock. Unconscious upon rescue from Chandeleur Sound, same position, gave two minutes of Respiration, regained shallow breathing. Regained consciousness at 0200. Kept both men warm with hot water bottles and blankets. Upon arrival at the dock, time 0315R, both men delivered to Army ambulance. Both men resting easy.

Used 400 gallons of gas (91) Octane.

Prepared by James B. Wallace

E. J. SYDAM

(Commanding officer)

Rank C.B.M.

Rank Commander, USCG

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reports shall be submitted in all cases of actual or attempted assistance.
2. Reports shall be typewritten and numbered serially for each fiscal year. Reports of assistance to, or searches for, derelicts shall be similarly numbered in a separate series.
3. Under "Remarks" give an account of operations, including list of deaths or serious injuries, any unusual delays, difficulties, outstanding performances of duty, and details of professional or public interest. Use additional sheets if necessary.
4. The numbers after certain words are code numbers for headquarters' use only.
5. "Persons actually saved from drowning" include those who in all probability would have been drowned if Coast Guard assistance had not been rendered. "Persons rescued from positions of peril" include those whose lives were endangered by possible drowning or other cause.
6. State opinion as to whether or not casualty was partly or wholly due to unseaworthiness, inadequacy or lack of equipment, or incompetency of personnel, and, if so, elaborate in "Remarks."

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-5221

CG-63044

Bigelow, Fred H. (0725047), 1st Lt., Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas.

Rescued app. 0030, 11-28-44

Dx: Exposure for 6 hours with mild state of shock. Aromatic Spts: Ammonia administered at 0040, and $\frac{1}{4}$ gr. morphine sulfate injection. Resting well at 0300.

Jones, William E. (14202825), Corporal, Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas.

Rescued app. 0030, 11-28-44.

Dx: Exposure with shock. Unconscious upon rescue. Given 2 minutes of respiration. Heat applied with hot water bottle immediately. Breathing shallow. Regained consciousness at 0200. $\frac{1}{4}$ gr. morphine sulfate injection at 0215 and aromatic spts. Ammonia internally at 0230. Resting well at 0300.

Both men delivered to Army ambulance at app. 0315.

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STATEMENT

29 November 1944

At approximately 1730, 27 November 1944, I saw a B-29 airplane coming in for a landing. I saw that the #1 engine was missing from mount. Bombardier and Co-pilot were missing from their stations when plane pulled up in parking position on the line. I assumed Pilot had bailed out the crew. I entered ship and asked the Pilot if he wanted me to kill the engines for him. He said, "Yes". I found all mixture controls locked in the auto rich position. I killed the three running engines according to Technical Order 02-1-29 and discovered that #3 engine had overheated and continued to run. It stopped in approximately one minute. #3 engine was smoking badly, I climbed out Pilot's window and made investigation as to fire. I would not permit firemen to turn water on engine. I got back in cockpit to make a final check. I turned battery switch on to raise the flaps, Captain Krug said, "Your booster pumps are running". I found that #1 engine pump was inoperative, due to knob being twisted off. I found fuel shut-off valves in "on" position on all four engines. I checked CO2 fire extinguisher in case #3 engine fired up and found both bottles expended on #1 selector valve. Ignition switch was in "on" position for all four engines. I checked tank #1 for fuel and found it empty.

Robert H. Danley
 ROBERT H. DANLEY, 6025104
 W/Sgt., Line Chief,
 Keesler Field, Miss.

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STATEMENT OF CONTROL TOWER OPERATOR

I, Cpl. James J. Back, ASN 15097582, was on duty in B Position in the Keesler Field Tower on 27 November 1944.

At approximately 1715C we received a call from Army 447 giving position as 50 miles S-SW of Keesler Field, advising that he had lost one engine, that the crew had bailed out, and calling for an emergency landing at this Field.

Lt. Col. Stoffer and the Operations Dispatcher were notified by me thru the intercom. Then I phoned the Crash Crew and told them to stand by. I was unable to contact Crash Boats, so put out a blind call giving position. Then I notified the Keesler Field Telephone Operator to start a Crash Procedure alarm for both on and off the airfield. Then a blind call was put out to three CA-10s on a practice search, giving the location where the crew bailed out and instructing them to proceed to that location. This was all logged at approximately 1720.

About five minutes later we received a call from Army 447 to determine if our Field was the one to the east or to the west, and we told him it was the easternmost Field. The aircraft was spotted in the direction of Gulfport, entering our pattern on the down wind leg for a landing on Runway 31. At this time we discovered that the plane was a B-29. Until then we did not know type of aircraft, nor did we want to bother him with another call to find out. He was cleared and #1 to land as he turned on the base leg. The aircraft bounced quite high in landing but was kept well under control.

James J. Back
 JAMES J. BACK - ASN 15097582
 Cpl. - Keesler Field, Miss.

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STATEMENT OF B-29 ENGINEERING OFFICER

and

UNSATISFACTORY REPORT FORM 54

RESTRICTED

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-35-

Incl 8

S T A T E M E N T

8 December 1944

TO: Keesler Field Accident Officer, Keesler Field, Miss.

1. The undersigned was directed to come to this station and supervise the dis-assembly of the #1 Engine Nacelle of B-29, #42-24447, and to inspect the wing panel thoroughly before re-installing a new engine. The following pertinent information is submitted;

a. Engine type, R-3350-23A, Ser. No. 43-149573, purchased 6 July 1944 from Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Paterson, N.J. and installed on B-29 42-6404.

b. Engine removed at 324:10 hours due to valve broken in #3 cylinder, also ignition trouble, and time expired.

c. Engine sent to OJASC, 10-21-44, and given major overhaul. Reason: External Failure. Engine equipped with complete set of Cylinder Air Blast Baffles and standard Piston and Cylinder assemblies. Total Time - 324:00 hrs.

d. Engine installed on B-29 42-24447, 11-16-44. Total hours since overhaul, 20:05 hrs.

e. After inspecting the remainder of nacelle, the following items were noted:

- (1) Fire burned up and to the rear following both fuel and oil lines. The fire followed oil line to the tank which was charred black. The fire followed fuel line to a point approx. 6 inches outside of nacelle on leading edge of wing. Fire did not damage wing spar.
- (2) Only upper nacelle was burned. Lower part of Nacelle was apparently ripped off by weight of the engine and that part of nacelle that was attached to engine when it fell off. Oil cooler and oil cooler section was completely wiped away but the wing area where oil cooler section attaches was not burned. The remaining rivets and small torn pieces of metal that were a component part of the oil cooler section were not burned or overheated.

f. From all indications, the fire was started by broken, ruptured, loose, or deteriorated fuel line near the engine.

g. #2 engine was found to have a leaking carburetor on 29 Nov. 44. Pilot said all carburetors were given a pressure check before departing from Great Bend. The carburetors will sometimes start leaking after sitting overnight.

h. #3 engine was found to have a bad right magneto. Upon removal of cover plate, it was found to be completely saturated with oil.

i. #4 engine; positive cut-off of carburetor was inoperative allowing fuel to flow thru the carburetor with mixture control in idle cut-off.

Robert E. Miller

ROBERT E. MILLER,
1st Lt., A. C.
Aircraft Maint. Officer,
Great Bend Army Air Field, Kans.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 54
(Revised 2-15-43)

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES

UNSATISFACTORY REPORT

(See AAF Reg. 15-54 for Information on Proper Use of this Form)

TO BE FILLED IN BY STATION	
STATION SERIAL No.	DATE SUBMITTED
44-145	12-11-44

LEAVE BLANK		
A. S. C. SERIAL No.	REFER TO	CLASS

STATION Keesler Field, Miss.		ORGANIZATION 4503d AAF Base Unit, Service Sq (Sp), Army Air Field, Scott Road, Kansas	
SUBJECT OF REPORT Property Class—Name		Manufacturer AAF Order or Shipping No.	
AIRCRAFT—Model & AAF Serial No. B-29-27 42-24047		ENGINE—Model & AAF Serial No. B-3350-23A 149573	
UNIT OR ACCESSORY—Type, Model and Serial No.			
AIRCRAFT REPORTS ONLY LAST D. I. R.—Depot		Date Flying Time Since Total Flying Time 687:30	
ENGINE REPORTS ONLY LAST OVERHAUL—Depot OCATSC		Hours Since 20:05 Depots and Hours At Each Previous Overhaul OCATSC 324:00	
PART Name		Part Drawing, Serial and Specification No.	
Time in Use		Quantity on Hand Quantity Known Defective No. Previous Failures Manufacturer Inspector's No. or Identification	
Indicate by "X" Disposition of Exhibit		☐ Photographed and Prints Enclosed ☐ Held for Instructions ☐ Sent Under Separate Cover ☐ Sent in Attached Package ☐ Repaired and Returned to Service ☒ Disposed of (Explain Below.) ☐ To Overhaul Facility (INITIALS)	

GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS, PROBABLE CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW:
(Use Only Applicable Spaces Above—Avoid Unnecessary Repetition)

EXPEDITE

DETAILS:

While on a routine training mission fire occurred in #1 nacelle. The engine burned off completely and fell into the Gulf of Mexico. The fire burned the upper rear of the nacelle, following both fuel and oil lines. It followed the oil line to the tank, charring it black. It followed the fuel line to a point approximately six inches outside the nacelle on the leading edge of the wing. The wing spar was not damaged. Only the upper nacelle burned; however, the lower nacelle was apparently ripped off by weight of the engine and fell with the engine. Oil cooler and oil cooler section were completely torn away, but wing area where oil cooler section attaches was not burned.

PROBABLE CAUSES:

From all indications, the fire was started by broken, loose, ruptured, or deteriorated fuel line near the engine.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.

R. E. MILLER
1st Lt. A.C.
Acft Maint Officer

ROUTING

SEND ORIGINAL AND TWO COPIES DIRECT TO COMMANDING GENERAL,
HQ. AIR SERVICE COMMAND, PATTERSON FIELD, FAIRFIELD, OHIO.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 35-34527-1






-17-


(N)

Right under portion
#1 variable













1. Approximate location where Pilot ~~Bumgar~~ stated he believed his crew bailed out at 1715C, 27 Nov. 1944.
2. Gulfport Rescue Boat P-728 was anchored in this location during the bombing and emergency but did not observe either phase, until advised by Gulfport radio at 1745C of the occurrence. Gulfport had been trying for 15 mins. to establish the contact but radio reception was very faulty.
3. Navigator on OA-10A which rescued Cpl. Johnston at 1800C estimated the position as 29° 53 mins. N. and 89° 03 mins. W.
4. Second OA-10 which assisted first OA-10 to locate airmen in the water re-estimated the position as 29° 50 mins. N. and 89° 07½ mins. W.
5. B-24 Pilot Wolfson at 1755C sighted five dye markers just before darkness and observed the 2 OA-10As on the water about a mile North. This observation was undoubtedly accurate, as Lt. Bigelow descended in a group of five and states that he noted the two PRYs land about 1/2 mile to his north. Both OA-10 navigators apparently erred in their position calculations.
6. Lt. Bigelow and Cpl. Jones were rescued at 29° 43 mins., 30 sec. N. and 89° 03 mins. W. by CG-cutter 63044 at 0030, 28 November 1944.
7. Lt. Clark's body was picked up at 29° 42½ mins. N. and 89° 13 mins. W. by P-263 at 1357C, 28 Nov. The latter position was about two miles South of where Lt. Bigelow and Cpl. Jones were rescued twelve hours previous.
8. Center of area where large fleet of shrimp trawlers were engaged.

Incl 4

7-746 A



RESTRICTED




HEADQUARTERS, KEEBLER FIELD
KEEBLER FIELD, MISSISSIPPI

11 December 1944

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Report (AAF-FS-T8)

TO : Commanding General, AAF, Winston-Salem 1, N. C.
Attention: Chief of Flying Safety

Attached herewith is AAF Form 14 and related papers in the case of 1st Lt. Eugene W. Hammond of the Great Bend (Kans.) AAF who was piloting B-29 Serial 42-24447, near this station on 27 November 1944.


ROBERT E. M. GOOLRICK,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

- 10 Incls:
- Incl. 1 - AAF Form 14
 - Incl. 2 - Stmt. of Pilot
 - Incl. 3 - Stmt. of Sta. Acc. Officer
 - Incl. 4 - Map of Area
 - Incl. 5 - Stmts of Survivors
 - Incl. 6 - Stmts of Rescue Personnel
 - Incl. 7 - Stmts of Airdrome Witnesses
 - Incl. 8 - Stmt of B-29 Engrg. Officer & UR
 - Incl. 9 - Acft. Forms & Records
 - Incl. 10- Photographs (7)

727

RESTRICTED

-1-

10034

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY
WINSTON-SALEM, N.C.

DATE 1/30/44

THIS CIRCULATION SLIP WILL REMAIN WITH AND BECOME A PART OF THE PERMANENT RECORD
INFORMAL REPLY MAY BE MADE UNDER REMARKS, ALSO ON REVERSE SIDE, TURNING BOTTOM EDGE UP

TO	FROM	INITIALS	TO	FROM	INITIALS
	CHIEF FLYING SAFETY			SAFETY EDUCATION	R. & S.
	DEPUTY CHIEF, FLYING SAFETY			MEDICAL SAFETY	1944 NOV 30
	PLANS & ORGANIZATION			CHIEF OF REGIONS	13:41
	PROGRAMS & REQUIREMENTS			MATERIAL & MAINTENANCE	
	BUDGET & FISCAL			TRAINING & OPERATIONS	
	SAFETY ENFORCEMENT			ACCIDENT ANALYSIS	5005
	ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES			SQUADRON "A"	
	PERSONNEL (MILITARY)(CIVILIAN)			CLASSIFIED RECORDS	
	SUPPLY & SERVICES			MAIL & RECORDS	
	OFFICE SERVICES			FLIGHT RECORDS	
	REPRODUCTION				

ACTION DESTROY

NECESSARY ACTION
COMMENT & FORWARD
REPLY

ATTENTION: Major Coffey
COORDINATION
INITIAL
RETURN

SIGNATURE
INFORMATION
DISPATCH

727
- 48 -
ROBERT D. BROWN

30 November 1944

FLYING SAFETY

WINSTON SALEM, N. C.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
ARMY AIR FORCES,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

R. & J. J. JON

5005

144 NOV 30

13:48

ATTN: FLYING SAFETY

FWM/fb

APR 20 REFERRING TO 3 DASH 29 ACCIDENT CMA AIRPLANE #42 DASH 24447
KUNSLER FIELD 27 NOVEMBER 44 PRELIMINARY AIRPLANE ACCIDENT REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT CMA ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE INFORMATION FROM HQ ADVISES BELOW QUOTE THE STATUS
OF THE CREW THIS DATE PILOT NO INJURY CMA 3 CREW MEMBERS FOUNDED CMA ONLY INJURY
EXTENDED AND ~~Now~~ NEARLY RECOVERED CMA ONE CREW MEMBER INJURY FATAL CMA 7 CREW
MEMBERS MISSING PD ALL AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT READY TO CONTINUE SEARCH WHEN WEATHER
PERMITS PD CRILING NOW 400 FEET PD 14 BOATS NOW ENGAGED IN SEARCH CMA ALL LOCAL
FISHING BOATS ALERTED PD IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE CAUSE OF FIRE FROM EXAMINATION
OF AIRPLANE PD INTERVIEW OF PILOT REVEALS THAT MOTOR CANNOT FIRE CMA PROPELLER
COULD NOT BE FEATHERED CAUSING VIBRATION WHICH THREW THE AIRPLANE OUT OF CONTROL
PD THE CREW BAILED OUT PD MOTOR WAS SHAKEN OFF CMA PILOT AGAIN RECOVERED CONTROL
OF THE AIRPLANE PD FLEW INTO KUNSLER FIELD ALONG PD SIMILAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING
3 DASH 29 AIRPLANE HAS OCCURRED CMA AIRPLANE NOW AT MAXWELL FIELD CMA ACCIDENT BEING
INVESTIGATED PD IN THIS CASE TWO MOTORS FAILED CMA CREW BAILED OUT AND PILOT BROUGHT
AIRPLANE IN ALONG PD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW WHEN DATA OBTAINED US-DATE
PD CLOSING MILITARY END


PRICE

Certified by:

727-49-

THOMAS F. BELL, LT. COL., AIR CORPS
Chief of Region

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES FOR ACTION AAOFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY FOR INFO INTWINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA FOR FILE DATE 2 DEC 44

T.W.X.



TELEGRAM



ADM NET

WU 8 141/139 GOVT

KEESLER FIELD MISS 2 1121A

RAPID CG AAF ATTN CHIEF OFS WN

012130Z IN COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH THIRTY SECTION TWO
 AAF REGULATION SIXTY TWO DASH FOURTEEN EFFECTIVE AT 1500Z
 THIS DATE THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFICIALLY ABANDON THE
 SEZRGH FOR SEVEN MISSING AIRMEN FROM B-29 SERIAL TWO FOUR
 FOUR SEVEN WHO PARACHUTED INTOCHANDELEUR SOUND THIRTY
 SIX MILES SOUTH OF THIS STATION ON TWENTY SEVEN NOVEMBER
 1944 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL CONTINUE
 TO KEEP A MINIMUM OF TWO RESCUE BOATS IN THE ABOVE AREA
 AND COORDINATE WITH NEARBY AIR FORCE STATINS IN ORDER THAT
 AIR PATROLS WILL MAKE DAILY SEARCHES OF THE AREA IN AN
 EFFORT TO RECOVER ALL OF THE BODIES THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS
 ORGANIZED AND MAINTAINED A THOROUGH AIR AND SEA SEARCH
 SINCE THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE IS
 NO POSSIBILITY THAT ANY OF THE SEVEN MISING AIRMEN HAVE
 SURVIVED UNTIL THIS DATE 20-18-1281

GOODRICK CO KEESELER FIELD

NB214/17272 RLG

727*

37661-1-4075

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES FOR ACTION AA
 OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY FOR INFO INTELL
 WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA FOR FILE _____

DATE 29 NOV 44

T.W.X.



TELEGRAM



ADM NET

WSAL361 V BLX1365 NR 2 /RAPID/

FROM GOOLRICK CO KEESLERFIELD MISS.

TO CG AAF WINSTON SALEM N C ATTENTION CHIEF OFS

GRNCBT

280030Z SUPPLEMENTAL B 29 42 DASH 24447 ARMY AIR BASE GREAT BEND KANSAS
 27 NOVEMBER 1944 PILOT EUGENE W RAMMOND PD

E BOMBARDIER FRED H BIGELOW 1ST LT 21ST BOMBER COMMAND 2ND AIR FORCE,
 YES, REPORTED UNKNOWN CORRECT TO EXHAUSTION FROM OVER EXPOSURE, CONDITION
 GOOD.

GUNNER WILLIAM K JONES CPL 21ST BOMBER COMMAND 2ND AIR FORCE, YES,
 REPORTED UNKNOWN CORRECT TO EXHAUSTION FROM OVER EXPOSURE, CONDITION
 GOOD.

NAVIGATOR JAMES C CLARK 2ND LT O-2063363 21ST BOMBER COMMAND 2ND
 AIR FORCE, YES, REPORTED UNKNOWN CORRECT TO FATAL BELIEVED TO BE FROM
 DROWNING OR EXPOSURE.

INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR POSSIBLE SURVIVORS WILL CONTINUE ALTHOUGH POOR
 WEATHER IS PREVAILING OVER THE AREA. END 20-18-112201.

#4032/0134Z/BP


727

-51-

375548-44075

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES FOR ACTION AA
 OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY FOR INFO INTELL
 WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA FOR FILE _____
 DATE 28 NOV 1944



T.W.X.



TELEGRAM



ADM NET

FROM SVC KEESLER FIELD MISS 281058Z

TO SVC DESK WINSTON-SALEM NCAR

GR SVC

SOM NR 280550Z FILE NBR 20-18-112063 PAGE 2 UNDER G, NED C. JOHNSON
 LAST TWO WORDS IN PARAGRAPH SHOULD READ YES, EXPOSURE INSTEAD OF YES,
 UNKNOWN

CORR TO 3927/1056Z/DP

2-21B

19 BVG

7340

B-29
E0

W0

①

③9

727

-52-

370025-22075

15-11-27-2

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES FOR ACTION AA

OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY FOR INFO INTELL

WINSTON-SALE 4, NORTH CAROLINA FOR FILE

DATE 28 NOV 1944

XX

T. W. X.

TELEGRAM

ADM NET

FROM GOOLBRICK CO KEESLER FIELD MISS 280550Z

TO CG AAF WINSTON-SALEM NCAR ATTN CHIEF OFS

GRNC

PRELIMINARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

A 27 NOVEMBER 1944 1700C 38 MILES SOUTH OF KEESLER FIELD MISSISSIPPI

B B-29 42-24447 93 BOMB SQ 19 BOMB GP ARMY AIR BASE GREAT BEND KANSAS NO
ONE ENGINE TORE LOOSE DROPPING INTO SEA

C EUGENE W HAMMOND 1ST LT 93 BOMB SQ 19 BOMB GP 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR
FORCE ARMY AIR BASE GREAT BEND KANSAS NONE NONE

D SAME

E ~~XXXX~~ AC EDWIN H BRESHAM 2D LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN B, FRED H BIGELOW 1ST LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN N, JAMES C CLARK 2D LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN E, JOHN KELLEY 2D LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN O, ~~SEE~~ STACY F HOLLAND CAPT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES, UNKNOWN R, ROBERT D RIFE PFC 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN V, JOHN B SCHAEVERLEY CPL 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN G, RICHARD H LITTLE PFC 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN G WILLIAM K JONES CPL 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN G, NED C JOHNSON CPL 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN G, GEORGE J KENNEDY CPL 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES UNKNOWN

F NUMBER ONE ENGINE CAUGHT FIRE AT 12000 FEET CREW UTILIZED BOTH EXTINGUISHERS AND UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO FEATHER PROPELLER PILOT STATES CRAFT BECAME DIFFICULT TO CONTROL AND HE ORDERED THE CREW TO ABANDON

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES FOR ACTION _____

OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY FOR INFO _____

WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA FOR FILE _____

DATE _____

PAGE TWO

T.W.X.

TELEGRAM

ADM NET

SHIP AFTER ASCERTAINING THEY WERE ALL EQUIPPED WITH LIFE VESTS AND
 NOTIFYING KEESLER FIELD BY RADIO AND JETTISONING HIS BOMBS AND BOMB
 BAY FUEL TANKS. AFTER ELEVENTH MAN JUMPED AND AS THE PILOT PREPARED TO
 FOLLOW THE BURNING ENGINE TORE FREE FROM THE PLANE AND THE FIRE SUB-
 SIDED. PILOT WAS ABLE TO REGAIN GOOD CONTROL AND CIRCLED SCENE AND NOTED
 DESCENDING CREW WELL GROUPED PILOT ADVISED KEESLER TOWER THAT HE WOULD
 XXX ATTEMPT NORMAL LANDING AT THIS STATION WHICH HE SINGLY ACCOMPLISHED
 SEA SEARCH WAS DIRECTED TO AREA WHICH PILOT BELIEVED SURVIVORS WOULD BE
 FOUND BUT KEESLER ~~XXXXXXXX~~ OA-10A ON NAVIGATION MISSION NOTED DYE
 MARKERS AND ON INVESTIGATION ACCOMPLISHED RESCUE OF CPL NED JOHNSON AT
 DUSH AND GAVE ACCURATE LOCALTION 20 MILES DISTANT FROM ORIGNIAL POINT.
 THIRTEEN RESQUE BOATS ARE IN AREA WHICH IS NEARLY LAND LOCKED AND WATER
 TESTS SIXTY DEGREES FAHRENHEIT EXTENSIVE AIR SEARCH HAS BEEN ORGANIZED
 G ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ NUMBER ONE NACELLE STRUCTURE
 H NONW
 I GREAT BEND TO FREEMASON ISLAND TO HAVANA TO GREAT BEND
 J BOMBING AND NAVIGATION K CAVU WATER SURFACE 15 DEGREES 8 KNOTS
 L NONE M AFACG NOTIFIED END 20-180112063
 3927/0557Z/DP

727

54-

376610-44075

FROM GOOLRICK CG KEEBLER FIELD MISS 012243 Z

TO CG AAF WASH DC

012200Z SUPPLEMENTAL 2 DASH 29 SERIAL TWO FOUR FOUR SEVEN THIRTY
EIGHT MILES SOUTH OF KEEBLER FIELD MISS 27 NOVEMBER PILOT EUGENE W
HAMMOND PD

E AC EDWIN H GRESHAM 2ND LT 21 BOMBER COMD 2D AIR FORCE YES MISSING
PROBABLY FATAL

E JOHN KELLEY 2ND LT 21 BOMBER COMD 2D AIR FORCE YES MISSING PROBABLY
FATAL

C STACY F HOLLAND CAPT 21 BOMBER COMD 2D AIR FORCE YES MISSING
PROBABLY FATAL

R - Robert D. Rife, PFC, 21 Bomber Comd, 2 AF, yes, missing, Probably fatal.

V JOHN B SCHAEVERLEY CPL 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES MISSING
PROBABLY FATAL

G RICHARD H LITTLE PFC 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES MISSING
PROBABLY FATAL

G GEORGE J KENNEDY CPL 21 BOMBER COMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES MISSING
PROBABLY FATAL END 20-18-1282

RECD IN AFMC 012328z arm

DISTRIBUTION:

AF3 RWX PMP TAS

DCO-3 CST DMO FPA RES TAG

1964 DEC 2 AM 8 36

RECEIVED

727

27 Nov 44
Hammond, Eugene W.

B-29
42-28447

THIS CIRCULATION SLIP WILL REMAIN WITH AND BECOME A PART OF THE PERMANENT RECORD
INFORMAL REPLY MAY BE MADE UNDER REMARKS, ALSO ON REVERSE SIDE, TURNING BOTTOM EDGE UP

ACTION DESIRED:

NECESSARY ACTION	COORDINATION	SIGNATURE
COMMENT & FORWARD	INITIAL	XXXX
REPLY	RETURN	DISPATCH

3504:2e44c78

R50

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
RESTRICTED

TALLY NO.	45-58
FILE NO.	360-33

SUBJECT: Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field, 27 Nov. 1944

TO: Chief of Safety Region Seven, OFS, Kansas City, Mo. DATE 3 January 45

FROM: Captain Eugene W. Roddenberry, RSO, Safety Region Seven. DOCUMENT NO. 1
EWR/lis/Ha 0914

1. Attached is report on B-29 accident which occurred at Keesler Field, Mississippi, 27 November 1944.

2. Transmission of this report from this officer was considerably delayed due to, first, illness contracted while enroute to Keesler Field for a second visit in order to pick up pertinent information, and, second, orders to return to home office before investigation was satisfactorily concluded in the field. The report was finished by means of telephone and mail.

3. It is believed that considerable study of the search and rescue problems involved in this accident and in similar accidents is valuable in light of the extensive over-water operations now being performed in the Pacific theater by B-29 aircraft. Such a survey may secure basis for improvement of equipment and technique. The loss of life in this case serves to point out that some improvement is probably desirable and that, if success is desired in cases where greater distances, fewer craft of all types, and danger from enemy action is present, existing technique and equipment may prove insufficient.

4. Following recommendations are made on the report:

1. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies of strategically located fields near the route of flight, especially those with Sea Rescue equipment.
2. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies used by search, crash, and patrol vessels in the area passed, and that coordination with such units be established so that pertinent information concerning the whereabouts and availability of such sea craft is available to crews participating in such missions.
3. That the following equipment be made available to crews participating in overwater flight for attachment to the life belts:

One metal signaling mirror.
Two or more extra dye markers.
One metal whistle incorporating the best features available of sound distance, penetration of other noises, and volume of sound.
One waterproof flash lamp.

RESTRICTED

PAGE 1

2-1109 A.F.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RESTRICTED

TALLY NO	1-1-61
FILE NO	1-1-32

SUBJECT: Accident Report, B-39, ASN: 42-24447, Great Bend AFB, near Keesler Field, 27 Nov 44

TO:

DATE

FROM:

COMMENT No. _____

COMMENT NO. 1 - continued -

4. That the following equipment be made available to crews of army flying boats:

One life preserver with rope attachment.

5. That the appropriate research division be contacted regarding possible design and use of the following:

A series of sea markers contained together in such a manner that the action of water on the enclosing substance (at a predetermined rate of dissolving) would liberate a sea marker at designated intervals. The advantage of such a device is that at time of bail out over water the container could be thrown out with attached parachute. Intermittent markers would indicate the direction of current to searchers and at the same time provide a series of markers extending over a considerable area enhancing the possibility of locating the general area containing the survivors.

5. To date no action has been taken on any recommendations. It is recommended that this office forward all approved recommendations through channels to the proper command for comment and action.

1 Incl--
Accident Report w/attachments.

Eugene W. Roddenberry
EUGENE W. RODDENBERRY
Captain, Air Corps,
Regional Safety Officer.

727

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RESTRICTED

PAGE 2

GPO: 1947 O-347-24

RESTRICTED

Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 42-34447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field, 27 Nov 44

COMMENT NO. 1 - continued -

4. That the following equipment be made available to crews of army flying boats:

One life preserver with rope attachment.

5. That the appropriate research division be contacted regarding possible design and use of the following:

A series of sea markers contained together in such a manner that the action of water on the enclosing substance (at a predetermined rate of dissolving) would liberate a sea marker at designated intervals. The advantage of such a device is that at time of bail out over water the container could be thrown out with attached parachute. Intermittent markers would indicate the direction of current to searchers and at the same time provide a series of markers extending over a considerable area enhancing the possibility of locating the general area containing the survivors.

5. To date no action has been taken on any recommendations. It is recommended that this office forward all approved recommendations through channels to the proper command for comment and action.

EUGENE W. RODDENBERRY
Captain, Air Corps,
Regional Safety Officer.

1 Incl--
Accident Report w/attachments.

-60-

RESTRICTED

727

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALY NO.	45-58
FILE NO.	366.33

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Accident Report, B-25, ACSE: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Reesler Field,
27 May 1944

TO: Office of Chief of Regions, OCS, Winston-Salem, N. C.

DATE 11 January 45

FROM: Chief, Safety Region Seven, OCS, Kansas City, Missouri

COMMENT NO. 2
JAF/1c1/1a 0814

1. Forwarded for your information and further handling.
2. Recommendations contained in Comment 1, paragraph 4, subparagraphs 1 and 2, to be coordinated by this office. Second Air Force reactions will be forwarded under separate cover.
3. Comments on recommendations 3, 4, and 5 requested.

James A. Fisk
JAMES A. FISK
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Safety Region Seven

incl
n/c

NO. 100-100000
OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF SAFETY
376
100-100000

727

RESTRICTED

PAGE 2

3-1109 A.F.

RESTRICTED

5923

Accident Report, E-28, ACRN: 42-24467, Great Bend AAF, near Weesler Field,
27 November 1944

11 January 45

Office of Chief of Regions, OPR, Winston-Salem, N. C.

Chief, Safety Region Seven, SRS, Kansas City, Missouri

JAF/1cl/1a 0014

1. Forwarded for your information and further handling.
2. Recommendations contained in Comment 1, paragraph 4, subparagraphs 1 and 2, to be coordinated by this office. Second Air Force reactions will be forwarded under separate cover.
3. Comments on recommendations 3, 4, and 5 requested.

JAMES A. VISK
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Safety Region Seven

Incl
n/c



5-8-

727

RESTRICTED

-3-

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETYREGIONAL SAFETY OFFICER'S REPORT
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

SAFETY REGION SEVEN

1. REPORT SUBMITTED BY: Captain Eugene W. Roddenberry, RSO.
2. DATE SUBMITTED: 20 December 1944
3. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 27 November 1944
4. TIME OF ACCIDENT: 1715 CWT
5. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: 37 Miles South Keesler Field, Gulf of Mexico
6. AIRCRAFT: Type: B-29 ACSN: 42-24447
7. HOME STATION: Great Bend Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas
8. ORGANIZATION: 28th Bombardment Squadron, 19th Bomb Group, Second Air Force
9. RESULTS TO AIRCRAFT: Number 1 nacelle completely destroyed
Number 1 propeller and engine lost
10. HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT & ENGINE: The Number 1 engine was a model R3350-23A, Serial Number 43-149573, with 20:05 since last major overhaul. Total engine hours were 344:05.

The propeller, a Hamilton Hydromatic, had 381:55 since last major overhaul.

Study of historical forms yielded no information pertinent to the accident.
11. PILOT: Eugene W. Hammond, 1st Lt., O-726639
12. HOME STATION: Great Bend Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas
13. ORGANIZATION: 28th Bombardment Squadron, 19th Bomb Group, Second Air Force
14. PILOT HISTORY: Schools attended: Cal-Aero Academy, April 1942
Victorville, June 1942
Mather Field, July 1942
Hobbs, N. M., four-engine transition, August 1942
Lockbourne B-17 Instrument Stand., March 1944.

Total first pilot time:	1369:07
Time this type:	69:30
Time this model:	69:30

RESTRICTED

-1-

00 RESTRICTED 00

Time last 90 days: 83:15
Time last 30 days: 39:05
Time last 24 hours: none

(Other required information unavailable)

15. CO-PILOT: Edwin H. Gresham, 2nd Lt., O-771702
16. HOME STATION: Great Bend Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas
17. ORGANIZATION: 28th Bombardment Squadron, 19th Bomb Group, Second Air Force
18. CO-PILOT HISTORY: Not applicable.
19. RESULTS TO CREW: P: Eugene W. Hammond, 1st Lt., AC, ASN O-726639
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp.
Results: No injury.

AC: Edwin H. Gresham, 2nd Lt., AC, ASN O-771702
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp.
Results: Missing.

B: Fred H. Bigelow, 1st Lt., AC, ASN O-725047
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp.
Results: Minor injury, shock and exposure.

N: James C. Clark, 2nd Lt., AC, ASN O-2063363
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Fatal

E: John Kelley, 2nd Lt., AC, ASN O-860701
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Missing

O: Stacy F. Holland, Captain, AC, ASN O-725064
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Missing

R: Robert D. Rife, Pfc., AC, ASN 15375525
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Missing

V: John B. Schaefferly, Cpl. AC, ASN 33513726
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Missing

G: Richard H. Little, Pfc., AC, ASN: 35903370
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Missing

G: William K. Jones, Cpl., AC, ASN 14202825
Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
Results: Minor injury, shock and exposure

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G: Ned C. Johnson, Cpl., AC, ASN: 37224492
 Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
 Results: Minor, shock and exposure

G: George D. Kennedy, Cpl., AC, ASN 13187685
 Organization: 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Gp
 Results: Missing

20. NARRATION OF EVENTS: B-29, ACSN 43-24447 took off from Great Bend AAF, Great Bend, Kansas, at 11:45 CWT on a combination Bombing and Navigation mission. At 17:15 CWT, immediately after a bomb run on Freeman Island (37 miles south Keesler Field, Mississippi), smoke was observed coming from Number 1 engine. Closer scrutiny revealed fire which rapidly became more intense and appeared to be centralized in the top of the nacelle just fore of the intercooler. The propeller would not feather. Use of the engine fire extinguishers did not diminish the intensity of the blaze. The crew was alerted and prepared for bail out. At the pilot's command the men were checked to make sure that all were equipped with Mae West life belts. The fire appeared to be uncontrollable and of such intensity to make a let down and water landing too hazardous so the pilot ordered the crew to bail out. This was accomplished satisfactorily and survivors' statements indicate that all parachutes opened. As the pilot prepared to leave the airplane he observed the Number 1 engine drop off and the fire immediately became less intense. Very soon after this the fire went out. The pilot returned to his position and after ascertaining the frequency of the Keesler Field radio, called in and reported the accident and approximate position of the bail out. The pilot then flew to Keesler Field and accomplished a landing.

Upon receipt of the message from the aircraft the Operations Officer put into effect the Keesler Field Crash Procedure for Airdrome and Overwater Emergency. At about 1810 CWT an OA 10 (Catalina Flying Boat) radioed that they had picked up a man. At about 0030 CWT a Coast Guard surface craft radioed its base reporting that two survivors had been picked up. At 1357 CWT of the next day a body was found. The remainder of the men remained missing until 10 December 1944. A later telephone conversation revealed that two more bodies have been found by 18 December 1944.

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21. INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED: 1. Study of the remains of the engine nacelle indicates that the cause, or immediate effect of some minor failure was a fuel fire. The possibility of a fuel leak was present. Investigation along these lines produced interesting evidence:

a. A study of the Cruise Control Log reveals that during the hour before, the total gas consumption was about 528 gallons per hour at 2100 RPM and 31.5 inches MP with mixture lean. Three hours previous to this the overall gasoline consumption was 482 gallons per hour at 2125 RPM and 32 inches MP with mixture rich. In short, three hours previous to the accident, with greater gross weight, higher power, richer mixture setting, the engines were consuming 46 less gallons per hour than three hours later under better conditions. While the engines, with constant mixture, should normally consume about 28 gallons more per hour at 12-14,000 feet (the later cruising altitude) than at 8,000 feet (the previous altitude), the difference shown upon the engineer's Cruise Control Chart is considerably greater than that. (Computations from Handbook AN 01-20EJ-1). Possibility of failure of the mixture control system is present due to the fact that adjustment to lean resulted in no reduction in fuel consumption.

b. Errors in the "Fuel Remaining" column of the flight engineer's Cruise Control Log were present and the actual fuel may have been actually considerably less than computed, if the fuel consumption rate was computed correctly. Numerous discrepancies in the Log make questionable any tabulation made. It was possible to ascertain that cruising gasoline consumption ran about 528 gallons per hour at 32 MP and 2150 RPM; climb at 940 gallons per hour with 43.5 MP and 2400 RPM and 1100 gallons per hour for climb at 47.5 MP and 2600 RPM.

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c. At about 1500 CWT, after about three to four hours of flight, the total fuel consumption began to climb higher than preflight computations had predicted.

d. The major damage by fire occurred to the upper portion of the nacelle. It is likely that the engine ripped off following the burning through or weakening of the upper supports by fire, the weight of the engine causing failure of the lower supporting members. Inspection of the oil line terminal (at the oil tank) indicates that oil contributed to the fire. The path of the oil line shows considerable heat and charring. The fuel line was burnt through at a point about six inches outside of the nacelle at the leading edge of the wing. Considerable damage by fire along the path of the fuel line to this point indicates an active fuel fire also present. Due to the loss of the engine it is impossible to ascertain whether such fires were the cause of the failure or were the result of a failure somewhere in the engine system. A study of fuel consumption (No. 1, a to c, under "Investigation Disclosed") does not preclude the possibility of a progressive fuel leak, resulting in the failure of the entire engine unit from fire.

e. Number 2 engine of the same airplane was found to have a leaking carburetor, after the airplane had landed at Keesler Field.

f. The right magneto of Number 3 engine of the same airplane was found to be completely saturated with oil.

g. Number 4 engine of the same airplane was found to have a defect in the carburetor which allowed fuel to flow through the carburetor with mixture control in idle cut-off.

2. Investigation disclosed no evidence of maloperation by pilot or crew. Discussions with survivors and personnel at Keesler Field regarding the procedures used indicate that recommended procedures were properly carried out by the pilot.

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3. No record of emergency broadcast by the radio operator could be found. The briefing folder for this trip does not contain Keesler or Gulfport AAF radio frequencies or indicate what Search-Rescue facilities are available in this area. Records at Keesler Field show four emergency descents on Keesler Field in forty days by Second Air Force aircraft on similar missions.
4. No record of the presence of surface craft in the vicinity of the flight was present in the Second Air Force briefing folder. A sixty-three foot crash boat was in the immediate vicinity at the time of failure. The crash boat was equipped with radio and it appears likely that coordination between Second and Third Air Forces to the extent of notifying flights of rescue craft patrol area, would have resulted in the ability of the radio operator to notify subject surface craft of the emergency condition and position, and thus facilitate the sea rescue problem that occurred.
5. Statements from bail out survivors included the information that all parachutes opened successfully. It was impossible to discover whether or not safe landings were made by any other crew members than those rescued.
6. It appears likely that most of the crew members believed that their clothing although water soaked, offered some protection against cold. Information at the Keesler AAF Sea Rescue School indicates that this is not the case. The failure to remove flying clothing will result in the expension of much energy to keep afloat. It is probable that the death of the crewman found on the second day was at least partially accountable to this fact. He was found in a partially submerged condition with lungs full of water. His flying boots were still on. Probable exhaustion and drowning were listed on the autopsy report.
7. A study of the sea search and rescue, although not completed, revealed the following: 727

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a. Immediately upon receipt of the emergency signal the available sea search and air search facilities available were alerted. Help from the following agencies was requested:

1. U. S. Coast Guard, Biloxi
2. Marine Base
3. Emergency Rescue School, Keesler AAF
4. Gulfport AAF

The official time of sunset in this area was 1744 CWT. At 1710 CWT two OALO's landed in the water and rescued one survivor. Satisfactory radio contacts at this time would have greatly assisted in the search problem. In rescuing the crew member, the crew of the OALO inadvertently drug him underwater for a distance and was not recovered until in a partially conscious condition. Due to this he did not inform them that other crew members were nearby. Unsatisfactory radio communication with the field kept the crewmen of the OALO from learning of the fact that a number of men were in the water. Discussion of this situation with the radioman of the OALO revealed that several types of radio are used in the OALO flying boats stationed at Keesler and he was not proficient in the type used that day. Discussion with another crewman revealed that a pain rope had been thrown the survivor who had gotten his leg entangled in it. The forward movement of the flying boat resulted in his head being drug under. He was saved by prompt action by a crewman of the OALO who dived overboard. It was suggested that the use of a life preserver on the end of the rope would have prevented the occurrence.

A mistake made in location by the navigator of the flying boat engaged in rescuing this survivor resulted in the search being directed in another area than that specified by the pilot as the place where the men had bailed out. It was not until the next day that the error was discovered by supervisory personnel and the search efforts were redirected to the area originally designated.

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At 0030 CWT a Biloxi based Coast Guard surface craft radioed that it had rescued two more survivors. Statements by these survivors indicate that the methods used by the coast guard craft were superior to those used by army surface craft and surface craft directed by other agencies.

Search was continued during that night utilizing flares dropped by aircraft. Poor weather was present the next day, greatly hampering search efforts.

22. PROBABLE CAUSE: Unknown.

23. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: Fuel and oil fire.

24. UNDERLYING CAUSE: Unknown.

25. COMMENTS: The facts pertaining to the failure of the engine are unknown due to the fact that the engine fell off the airplane in flight and was not recovered as the ship was over the Gulf of Mexico at the time. However, examination of the Cruise Control Log indicates the possibility of a progressive gasoline leak. Discrepancies in the Log make accurate estimation of fuel used, impossible. The general consumption, however, does come within allowable limits. Thorough investigation of the search and rescue performed in this and similar cases is believed important in light of the extensive over-water missions now being performed in the Pacific theater of operations by B-29 aircraft. Such a survey should be conducted to secure a basis for improvement of equipment and methods. The loss of life in this case serves to point out that improvement in existing facilities is desirable and that, if success is desired in cases where greater distances, fewer craft of all types, and danger from enemy action is present, existing techniques and equipment may be insufficient.

26. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies of strategically located fields near the route of flight, especially those with Sea Rescue equipment.
2. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies used by search, crash, and patrol vessels in the area passed, and that coordination with such units be established so that
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pertinent information concerning the whereabouts and availability of such sea craft is available to crews participating in such missions.

3. That the following equipment be made available to crews participating in overwater flight for attachment to the life belts:

One metal signaling mirror.
Two or more extra dye markers.
One metal whistle incorporating the best features available of sound distance, penetration of other noises, and volume of sound.
One waterproof flash lamp.

4. That the following equipment be made available to crews of army flying boats:

One life preserver with rope attachment.

5. That the appropriate research division be contacted regarding possible design and use of the following:

A series of sea markers contained together in such a manner that the action of water on the enclosing substance (at a predetermined rate of dissolving) would liberate a sea marker at designated intervals. The advantage of such a device is that at time of bail out over water the container could be thrown out with attached parachute. Intermittent markers would indicate the direction of current to searchers and at the same time provide a series of markers extending over a considerable area, enhancing the possibility of locating the general area containing the survivors.

27. ALLIED PAPERS ACCOMPANYING REPORT:
 1. Statement of Pilot.
 2. Statement of Accident Officer.
 3. Map.
 4. Statements of Survivors.
 5. Statements of Rescue Personnel.
 6. Statements of Airdrome Witnesses.
 7. Statement of B-29 Engineering Officer and Unsatisfactory Report Form 54.
 8. Aircraft Forms & Records.
 9. Photographs.

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28. ACCOMPLISHMENTS REGARDING RECOMMENDATIONS: All recommendations from 1 to 5 being forwarded by spec numbers to proper command for action.

Eugene W. Roddenberry
EUGENE W. RODDENBERRY
Captain, Air Corps,
Regional Safety Officer.

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Accident Report, B-29, ASN: 42-24447, Great Bend AAF, near Keesler Field, 27 Nov. 1944

Chief of Safety Region Seven, OFS, Kansas City, Mo.

3 January 45

Captain Eugene W. Roddenberry, RSO, Safety Region Seven.

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1. Attached is report on B-29 accident which occurred at Keesler Field, Mississippi, 27 November 1944.

2. Transmission of this report from this officer was considerably delayed due to, first, illness contracted while enroute to Keesler Field for a second visit in order to pick up pertinent information, and, second, orders to return to home office before investigation was satisfactorily concluded in the field. The report was finished by means of telephone and mail.

3. It is believed that considerable study of the search and rescue problems involved in this accident and in similar accidents is valuable in light of the extensive over-water operations now being performed in the Pacific theater by B-29 aircraft. Such a survey may secure basis for improvement of equipment and technique. The loss of life in this case serves to point out that some improvement is probably desirable and that, if success is desired in cases where greater distances, fewer craft of all types, and danger from enemy action is present, existing technique and equipment may prove insufficient.

4. Following recommendations are made on the report:

1. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies of strategically located fields near the route of flight, especially those with Sea Rescue equipment.
2. That the Briefing Folders used by Second Air Force for overwater flights include the radio frequencies used by search, crash, and patrol vessels in the area passed, and that coordination with such units be established so that pertinent information concerning the whereabouts and availability of such sea craft is available to crews participating in such missions.
3. That the following equipment be made available to crews participating in overwater flight for attachment to the life belts:

One metal signaling mirror.
Two or more extra dye markers.
One metal whistle incorporating the best features available of sound distance, penetration of other noises, and volume of sound.
One whirlywind flash lamp.

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STATEMENT OF KEESLER FIELD ACCIDENT OFFICER
RE B-29 ACCIDENT, 27 NOV. 1944

At 1717G, 27 November 1944, the undersigned was on duty in the Operations Office at this station when the Control Tower called thru the intercom that airplane 447 had been on fire, that the crew had bailed out 15 miles southwest of Freemason Island, and that the plane was going to attempt an emergency landing at this station. The Tower was ordered to broadcast blind to all Keesler Field OA-10 aircraft that an emergency existed and to proceed to the point mentioned by the Pilot of the disabled plane. The undersigned ordered the Keesler Field crash procedure, both on the airdrome and over the water, effected and went down to the apron to observe the landing attempt.

The B-29 was then about three (3) miles distant, at 2000 feet, wheels down, and descending vertically approximately 1000 feet per minute, altho it appeared to be in a normal flying attitude. The runway approach to the NW at this station is a difficult one on account of 66 ft. trees on both ends as it gives the appearance of being about 4000 feet. The undersigned noted the #1 Engine nacelle missing when the plane was about 200', and the Pilot accomplished a landing slightly hard but not abnormal on the first third of the runway. The Pilot completed his landing roll at about 3500', proceeded ahead to a cut-off strip, then backed on the apron to a spot that the undersigned had recommended. The Tower logged the landing at 1730, just fourteen (14) minutes after the emergency radio call. It was noted that the plane had landed with both bomb bay doors open and full flaps, and only the Pilot was visible.

The Keesler Field Line Chief, W/Sgt. Danley, immediately climbed up into the cockpit where the Pilot was setting his brakes so that he could go to the engineer compartment to shut down the remaining three engines. The engine cowl flaps were in trail position, and considerable fire was coming from #3 Engine exhaust. W/Sgt. Danley stated that he cut off the engines at the Pilot's request, and the undersigned requested the Pilot to come into the Hangar in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the accident.

The Pilot stated that he was flying approximately four (4) minutes past Freemason Island on a southerly heading when he heard the right scanner call the engineer to inform him that heavy black smoke was pouring out of the bottom of #1 Engine. The Pilot stated that he immediately turned to observe same and when he did, the whole nacelle was in flames. He immediately closed the throttle on that engine and attempted to feather the prop, which was ineffective. He ordered the engineer to accomplish emergency procedure and ordered the Co-pilot to alert and check the crew for emergency procedure over-water. He ordered the Bombardier to jettison the bomb bay fuel tanks and bombs. When both fire bottles leading into the #1 nacelle had been expended without having any effect on the fire, he headed the plane toward the west which appeared to be the nearest shore point. The plane had descended from 12,000 to 10,000 feet up to this point.

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He next ordered the crew to abandon ship, which was becoming unmanageable, and went into a sharp left spiral while on "automatic", after several men had bailed out. He disengaged the "automatic" and righted the plane manually in order that the rest of his crew could abandon ship, which they did. He stated that just as he was preparing to leave, he glanced at #1 engine and noted that it had torn itself free from the ship and that the fire had suddenly extinguished itself. He then circled the descending airmen and noted about ten descending parachutes. He then changed over to the Co-Pilot's seat in order to tune his radio compass in on this station, as he was not certain of the general location. After referring to his facility chart, he changed back to the left seat and called the Keesler Tower, informing him of his fire, and also of his intentions to attempt an emergency landing. The Tower in acknowledging the call advised him that the winds favored a landing to the NW and that the runway was reserved for his landing.

The undersigned had the plane searched for parachutes and life vests while the Pilot was talking, and received a report that two (2) chest pack chutes and one (1) back pack chute and one (1) Mae Vest were onboard the plane, the Mae Vest and back pack belonging to the Pilot; and a later check of the briefing questionnaire revealed that two spare chutes were stowed on the airplane.

The Pilot appeared calm and deliberate and certain in recalling what occurred during the emergency.

By 1740G help had been requested from the following agencies for assistance in rescuing the eleven (11) airmen who descended into the waters on the Chandeleur Sound about thirty-five (35) miles south of this station: U. S. Coast Guard, Biloxi; Marine Base; Emergency Rescue School; and the Gulfport Army Air Field. The request asked that all available water-and air- craft be dispatched to the above vicinity and report progress by radio to this station. The Gulfport Army Air Field had listened to the radio conversation and advised that a rescue boat was 1½ miles from Freemason Island and an attempt was being made to establish contact, which was made at 1745G.

The official time of sundown in this locality was 1744 GMT for that date, and at 1750 an OA-10A from this station advised the Tower that two planes were preparing to descend into the water in an effort to rescue an airman who had been sighted near a dye marker. At 1810 the Pilot radioed that he had picked up a partially unconscious man and was proceeding to this station, and that darkness had occurred in that area. The two OA-10As had been returning from a navigation mission when the dye marker was observed, and the rescued man was partially unconscious and unable to inform them until the plane arrived at this station that a number of men had bailed out in that area. The undersigned talked to the airman, who was identified as Cpl. Ned C. Johnson, the right scanner, and he stated that he saw only two (2) parachutes besides his own descend into the water. He was admitted to the hospital along with P/O Thomas L. Stanley, Jr. of the OA-10, who dove into the water to assist in Johnson's rescue after he became entangled and dragged under the water with a rescue rope.

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While the above plane was enroute to this station, the Navigator was questioned as to the exact location of the rescue, and he stated that it was accomplished at 29° 53' north and 89° 03' west and that he estimated the waves at four (4) feet high and the wind from 15° at eight (8) MPH. The above information was immediately transmitted to all agencies engaged in the search. The above location was fourteen (14) miles north of where the Pilot estimated that his crew bailed out and the search was centered from the new location.

No further essential information was received from the search area, where it was estimated that thirteen crash boats were combing the waters and were aided by flares dropped by Second Air Force B-17s from Gulfport. Shortly after midnite at 0030G the Biloxi Coast Guard surface craft CG-63044 radioed to its Base that it had rescued Lt. Bigelow, the navigator, and Cpl. Jones, the left scanner, and was proceeding to the Biloxi Municipal Pier. Lt. Bigelow was reported as being in good shape, and Cpl. Jones very weak; and necessary medical arrangements were made to take care of the men at Keesler Hospital. Lt. Bigelow later informed the undersigned that he had counted eleven (11) chutes descending and that he believed he was only a mile and one-half (1½ miles) from the OA-10s that had landed in the water. The last men were rescued at a position of 29°, 43 minutes and 30 seconds north, and 89° and 3 minutes west. A re-check with the crew of the OA-10 which made the first rescue revealed that the navigator had made a miscalculation and was in error regarding the first position reported, and that the men had descended in the approximate position of where the Pilot had originally stated that he thought they had.

The following rescue boats were engaged thruout the night up to this period:

<u>Keesler Field</u>	<u>Gulfport AAF</u>	<u>Emergency Rescue School Keesler Field</u>	<u>Biloxi Coast Guard</u>
P-283 (83 ft.)	P-728 (63')	P-442 (85')	CG-63044
P-455 (45 ft.)	P-70 (83')	P-593 (85')	CG-63056
P-51 (42')	P-248 (83')	P-632 (63')	
	P-77 (a tug)	P-677 (63')	

The above boats were augmented before daybreak by the following boats, which were in or enroute to the area: 3 - 85' and 3 - 63', and 1 - 45' from the Emergency Rescue School, and 2 - shallow draft (24') from the Keesler Field Boat Company, making a total of 22 surface craft. It is estimated that nine (9) aircraft also reached the scene before darkness had set in the night before.

At daybreak a total of 75 aircraft and one blimp engaged in the air search over the area. The aircraft came from the following bases:

Keesler Field - 21, including 6 amphibious
 Biloxi Coast Guard - 3 amphibious
 Gulfport AAF - 30 B-17s
 Pensacola Naval Air Station - 5 PBVs
 San Marco (Tex.) AAF - 16 planes
 Houma (La.) Naval Air Station - 1 blimp. (2nd Day - 2 blimps).

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The San Marcos flight arrived at this station on a navigation mission at mid nite and were especially equipped for an over-water return flight. Permission was obtained from the Commanding Officer of that station to utilize their services in the search.

The area immediately to the south was patrolled by a fleet of forty-seven (47) powered boats who were engaged in shrimp fishing. These boats are spread out and they cover an area of over sixty square miles daily in their trawling. Radio Station WGM Gulfport makes periodic weather and market information broadcasts to these boats who stay out five or six days at a time. The above station stated that following a request from the undersigned the news of the missing airman was transmitted to the above boats along with a request that they keep a sharp lookout for survivors and bodies.

The weather turned bad two hours after daylight the morning following the accident, and the Commanding Officer, Keesler Field ordered all aircraft except four (4) OA-10s from the scene when visibility dropped down to one mile with heavy showers prevailing. The OA-10s conducted their operations below 200 foot altitude. Aircraft were dispatched thruout the day when visibility permitted and altitude separation and left turns were established for each type of aircraft. The surface craft search procedure was coordinated under the direction of Maj. Eliason, Director of Marine Training, Emergency Rescue School, Keesler Field.

At 1357G of the second day the ERS crash boat P-630, commanded by 2nd Lt. Harold Eaton, recovered a body, later identified as 2nd Lt. James G. Clark, Navigator. The recovery was made two (2) miles south of the position where Lt. Bigelow and Cpl. Jones were picked up twelve (12) hours previous. Lt. Eaton's log indicates the body was found at 29° 43 mins. N and 89° 13 mins. W in a partially submerged attitude. His flying boots were still on and the autopsy revealed that his lungs were full of water and his death was due to drowning and probable exhaustion.

The search continued until 1000G, December 2, when it became evident that the chances of survival had expired. Routine searches are still conducted daily (10 December), and will be conducted until 27 December 1944. These searches are part of the Emergency Rescue School training OA-10s and rescue boats who have daily missions into the area where it is believed bodies might be recovered.

The following details are recorded with a view of preventing delays in responding to emergency situations overwater and to preventing loss of life:

1. The three airman who were rescued from the Gulf had expended most of their energy trying to remain afloat with heavy water logged flying clothing. They all stated that they believed it kept them warmer and did not realize it weighted them down. They did not realize that the Gulf waters were temperate enough to overcome immediate possibility of exposure.

ATT: PERSONAL
EQU.F. OFFICERS

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2. The above airmen state that rescue boats passed within one hundred (100) yards of them on several occasions and the sound of the engines drowned out their shouts for help. The men stated that they believe they could have attracted attention had they possessed whistles.

ATT: PERSONAL
EQUIP. OFFICERS

3. There is no record that the radio operator broadcast an emergency warning when the fire occurred. The Second Air Force briefing folder for the Batista plan mission does not indicate the Keesler or Gulfport AAF radio frequencies plus Air-Sea Rescue facilities which are available in this area. It is believed that the above planned mission passes directly over this area, as there have been four (4) emergency descents on Keesler Field alone in forty (40) days by Second Air Force aircraft on similar missions.

ATT: COMMUNICA-
TIONS

4. There does not appear to be complete coordination between the Second and Third Air Forces who share joint use of the Freeman Island Danger Zone. The B-29 Pilot was unaware that a Gulfport AAF 65 ft. crash boat was $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Freeman Island during the period he was bombing his target. The Bombardier, Lt. Sigelow, when questioned by the undersigned stated that he saw the boat but did not attach enough significance to its presence to inform the Pilot until after the crew had been ordered to bail out.

ATT: Operations
& Training

5. The undersigned recommends that the following equipment be procured for the benefit of airmen who engage in overwater missions: a deflated (weather obs. type) balloon, a cartridge of helium to inflate same, and 20 ft. light twine in order to fasten one end on shoulder harness. A wicker type of light cord with a metallic protector and an automatic lighter would also provide a light marker to be fastened to the above balloon to aid surface craft in searching for stranded floating airmen during hours of darkness.

ATT: Pers. Equipment
and Research

6. The following items are listed as having a possible bearing on the fire which occurred in the #1 Engine nacelle:

a. An analysis of the Engine Operation Record maintained by the Engineer in flight and other notations indicate that he estimated that the plane consumed approximately 1000 gallons less than the original flight plan in the first four hours. His figures at 1704G, eight minutes prior to the fire do not indicate a continued saving, altho power and RPM have been lessened to from 33 to 31.5 in. and 2200 to 2100 RPM, and mixture had been changed from Rich to Lean (Auto). Such

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loss could have been created by a rupture of the fuel line, in the forward part of the nacelle which may have been ignited by exhaust gases.

- b. The right lower section appears to have received the most intense heat in the section near the fuel line. Such a continued leak might account for the failure of the fire extinguisher to quench the flames.
- c. The fire burned thru the upper section of the nacelle which permitted the engine to drop and tear loose by its own weight. Lt. Bigelow, one of the last men to jump, noticed an object fall which he first believed to be an airman whose chute was inoperative. After counting the descending airmen and observing the B-29 continue in controlled flight, he believes the object was the falling engine.

NOTE:

An informal meeting has been called to convene 12 December 1944 at the Biloxi Coast Guard Station by the Commandant, 8th Naval District to coordinate a joint Air-Sea Rescue plan for this area. Representatives from Keesler Field, Gulfport AAF and the Biloxi Coast Guard Air Station will discuss a comprehensive plan by which the joint facilities may be speedily activated to assist in emergencies. It is believed that all activities can be coordinated from a single control station by the agency which assumes jurisdiction of the emergency.

All military activities who conduct operations in this area will be notified when such plan is approved.

Charles T. Stoggin
CHARLES T. STOGGIN,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Station Accident Officer,
Keesler Field, Miss.
10 December 1944.

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OFFICE OF FLIGHT SAFETY

TECHNICAL
AND EVALUATION

STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR (PILOT)

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I, 1st Lt. Eugene W. Hammond, ASN O-726639, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, acted as airplane commander on B-29, #447, Crew #35.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1715 cwt we had just made a bomb run on Freeman Island, crossed the target, and had flown for approximately five minutes in a southerly direction. The engine instruments and engines seemed to be functioning properly, when the left gunner reported smoke coming from #1 engine. I observed the engine and fire was coming out from around the cowlings and I told my Co-Pilot, 2nd Lt. E. H. Gresham, to prepare the crew for abandonment. While he was doing this, I attempted to feather the #1 engine and had the engineer carry out his fire procedure. The engine did not feather and the engineer used both engine fire extinguishers on the #1 engine to no avail. I ordered the bombardier, 1st Lt. Fred Bigelow, to salvo bombs and bomb-bay tanks. I then told Lt. Gresham to check that all crew members had their Mae Wests on. At that time I observed that the fire was uncontrollable and was burning around the entire area and spreading over the left wing. I then ordered the crew to abandon ship.


As the crew started abandonment, the plane started a tight spiro to the left. I managed to gain control of the plane while the rest of the crew bailed out. I circled and saw approximately ten opened chutes. I was about to abandon the aircraft when the #1 engine fell out of its mount and the plane became controllable. The action seemed to extinguish the fire. I then trimmed the aircraft and set it on Auto-Pilot. I immediately got the radio facility chart and moved into the Co-Pilot seat, and tuned in Keesler Tower, and then returned to my original seat and called Keesler Tower on the Command, giving the emergency condition and approximate location of the accident. I requested the emergency landing instructions and proceeded to complete a normal landing on Runway #31. My bomb-bay doors were opened during the landing.

After landing I taxied to a stop on the apron and my flaps were still in a down position because the auxiliary power unit was inoperative. I set my parking brakes and started to move into the engineer's position, for the purpose of cutting the engines. At that time W/Sgt. Danley of Keesler Field entered the plane through the nose wheel well and cut the engines for me. I got out of the plane and was met by Lt. Col. Stoffer and proceeded to relate what had happened.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.

Eugene W. Hammond 79-
1st Lt. Eugene W. Hammond
ASN O-726639

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STATEMENTS OF SURVIVORS

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STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR

I, 1st Lt. Fred H. Bigelow, ASN O-725047, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, am a Bombardier on B-29 #447, Crew #35.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1715 cwt at a point about fifteen miles west of Freeman Island, at an altitude of 12,000 feet, the left gunner reported smoke in #1 engine. I was in my position and turned and looked towards that direction, noticing a large fire on top of #1 engine cowling. The Pilot ordered me to salvo my bombs and bomb-bay tanks. The Pilot then ordered the crew to prepare to abandon ship. I attached my Mae West and parachute, and on signal proceeded to the forward bomb-bay.


When the signal was given to bail out I jumped and was the seventh person to leave the plane. When my parachute opened, I turned and looked towards the aircraft, which was completing a slow circle to the left. I distinctly counted eleven parachutes open, including my own. While counting the chutes, I noticed a black object which I assume to be the #1 engine falling to the sea. I did not see it hit.

I observed an island off about five miles to the west. Upon landing in the water I disconnected the chest pack from the harness and inflated my Mae West, and then proceeded to swim towards the island. After about thirty minutes I noticed three PBV aircraft circle the scene of the accident searching for survivors. A B-24 which had joined the search evidently saw my sea marker dye and circled my position for approximately thirty minutes. The PBVs were unable to locate me. As dusk fell I still kept swimming towards the island. After about three hours, a surface craft passed approximately 150 yards from me but failed to hear my shout.

About one hour later, after repeated calls, I located Cpl. Jones. He and I joined company and took turns keeping each other afloat. We noticed ~~surface~~ aircraft at approximately 1,000 feet. They were dropping flares about five miles from us. We then saw a surface craft approaching and I waited until it was in hailing distance at which time I shouted and flailed my arms, creating a spray in order to attract their attention. They picked us up about 0030 28 November 1944 and administered excellent First Aid treatment. Upon docking we were brought to the hospital at Keesler Field.

I would recommend that in the future all Mae Wests be equipped with at least two packages of sea marker dyes and a water-proof light.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.


1st Lt. Fred H. Bigelow
ASN O-725047

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STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR

I, Cpl. Ned G. Johnson, ASN 37224492, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, as the right waist gunner on B-29 #447, Crew #35. I have served as gunner on this crew since 6 July 1944.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1715 cwt I was in my position in the right blister when the left gunner, Cpl. Jones, whose interphone was inoperative, exclaimed "El is smoking heavily". I immediately called the Pilot, Lt. Hammond, giving him the message and in a few seconds time heard the Co-Pilot giving the command over the interphone to prepare to abandon ship. The left gunner grabbed his parachute and went to the rear entrance door. At this time I assisted the Ringsight Gunner, Pfc. Little, into snapping his chest chute on. The Ringsight Gunner fastened my leg straps to my back pack. While we were preparing the alarm bell was audibly ringing in short rings, which is the signal to prepare for bail out. As near as I could ascertain, the left gunner, radar operator, and the tail gunner were standing by at the rear entrance door. Then the signal came to bail out and Pfc. Little bailed out through the rear bomb bay. I followed immediately and was the second to go out through this exit.

My parachute opened with a slight jolt and I looked up and saw the canopy pull open. I was facing due south, and looked up and observed to the left and the rear one open chute and to the right and the front one open chute. Those were the only chutes I observed. Shortly before landing in the water I endeavored to unfasten my leg straps but was unsuccessful because of my bulky clothing. Upon landing in the water I completely submerged and while submerged unfastened the two leg straps and the chest strap. I immediately bobbed to the surface and treaded water until I freed myself of the shroud lines. I then inflated my Mae West and held on to the chute with my left hand, and started swimming in a northerly direction.

I had been in the water approximately forty-five minutes when I had to let go of the chute. Immediately thereafter I sighted two PBV aircraft circling nearer and nearer from the south. I waited until they were near at which time I released the sea marker from my Mae West. The marker spread into somewhat of a circle, approximately forty feet in diameter. Both ships circled at a low altitude and dipped their wings, probably to acknowledge that they had seen me. Immediately one PBV landed about 2000 yards to my left. I assumed they were picking up the man whom I had seen at my left while descending. This plane then took off and joined the other PBV. They both circled again and again. The second PBV landed about 200 yards in front of me and taxied to my location. While he was maneuvering to get closer to me the other PBV, which had previously landed, landed the second time, this time about 400 yards in front of me. On the third attempt to throw me a line, which appeared to be a double rope, I finally grabbed hold of the line but immediately the plane started taxiing, and the sudden force pulled the rope from

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my grip and my left foot became entangled in a loop at the end of the rope. The plane continued to taxi and I was dragged under water until I finally lost consciousness. When I regained consciousness I was lying on a bunk in the PEY. Later I found out that a Flight Officer with the Rescue Crew had dived into the water and floated me with the assistance of the other man inside the plane. The crew removed my clothing and administered excellent first aid treatment. The plane then took off and landed at Keesler Field at which time I was removed to the hospital.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and heard.

/s/ Ned C. Johnson
Cpl. Ned C. Johnson
ASN 37224492

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STATEMENT OF SURVIVOR

I, Corporal William K. Jones, ASN 14202825, assigned to 28th Bomb. Squadron, 19th Bomb. Group, Army Air Base, Great Bend, Kansas, am the left Waist Gunner on B-29 #447, Crew #35. I have served as gunner on this crew since 6 July 1944.

At approximately 1715 cwt on 27 November 1944 I observed smoke coming from #1 engine, and I tried to contact the pilot but my intercom was inoperative so I had Cpl. Johnson, the right Waist Gunner, notify the pilot. At that time the #1 engine burst into flames and I heard the emergency alarm bell, which rang three times, which was the signal to prepare to abandon ship. I then proceeded to my bail out station, which is the rear entrance door, and waited for the signal to abandon ship. I then heard the bail out alarm and proceeded to jump out through the rear entrance door. I was the fourth to leave the ship.

When my parachute opened I tried to maneuver into a position close to the other three men who had already bailed out. I looked around on descending and counted eleven parachutes open, including my own. Upon landing in the water I loosened my leg straps and chest straps and inflated my Mae West. After freeing myself of the parachute I started swimming towards a small island approximately three to five miles away. Several searching planes were flying overhead at approximately 1000 feet, but I was unable to attract their attention. Several surface crafts were in the area but also were unable to locate me.

About 11:30 P.M. Lt. Bigelow and I, by shouts, attracted each other's attention and swam towards each other. We met and took turns keeping each other afloat. Approximately 0030, 28 November 1944 we were picked up by a Coast Guard search boat, and they immediately administered First Aid. We were then taken to shore and at that point taken to the hospital on Keesler Field.

I have read the above, and it is a true statement of what I saw and Heard.

William K. Jones
Cpl. William K. Jones
ASN 14202825

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STATEMENTS OF RESCUE PERSONNEL

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STATEMENT OF ~~RESTRICTED~~ PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN SEARCH

I, Lt. Aaron S. Wolfson, ASN O-713921, assigned to the Co-Pilot Branch stationed at Keesler Field, Mississippi, as a co-pilot instructor on B-24 aircraft. I have served in this capacity for the past six months and was previously graduated from B-24 Transition School at Liberal, Kansas.

On 27 November 1944 at approximately 1730 hours, I was circling Keesler Field at 5000 feet in B-24 42-52130, when, by reason of radio conversation, I found out that a B-29 aircraft was in distress. Shortly thereafter, the tower broadcast a call for all B-24 aircraft flying out of Keesler Field to stand by to engage in a search mission. I acknowledged the call and kept circling. Shortly afterward I saw a B-29 land on Runway #31. After a lapse of approximately five or ten minutes the tower gave me the approximate position of the bail out, and directions as to how to get there. They also inquired as to whether or not I had life rafts on board and, upon receiving an affirmative reply, they dispatched me on the search.

As I reached the approximate location, I saw two PBV's land on the water to pick up a survivor. Using this location as a starting point, I began a parallel search, using five minute east-west legs and turning one minute south. Shortly before sunset I located five sea marker dyes approximately halfway between Point Chico and Old Harbor Island at about the southernmost point of Chandeleur Island. Three of the marker dye spots were in almost a straight north to south line, about 500 yards apart. The other two were about a half mile further south in a northeast, southwest line. I was unable to see any men in the water. After making two 360° circles around the sea marker spots, it had become dark. I turned on my landing lights, continued circling and began trying to contact Keesler Tower. I was unsuccessful in this attempt on both Command and Liaison transmitter on frequencies 4495, 6210 and 3105. There was no other radio installed in the aircraft. The aircraft was not equipped with pyrotechnic devices nor were the life rafts accessible from within the plane. I broadcast blindly to other aircraft in the vicinity to no avail. I located a crash boat and tried blinking a coded SOS with first the recognition and then the landing lights. I received no response.

I then headed the aircraft for Keesler Field and kept, unsuccessfully, trying to establish contact with the tower. Immediately

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Statement of Personnel Engaged in Search

upon landing, I went into the Base Operations Office and reported to Major Prim, of the ERS. I pointed out the location and number of the sea marker dyes to him on a map.

I have read the above and to the best of my knowledge it is a true statement of what I saw and did.

Aaron S. Wolfson
AARON S. WOLFSON,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
ASN O-713921

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HEADQUARTERS
A.A.F. EMERGENCY RESCUE SCHOOL
KEESLER FIELD, MISSISSIPPI

STATEMENT

4 December 1944.

I, 2nd Lt. ROSS D. FRAKER, O-813496, am assigned to the Flying Training Section of the Emergency Rescue School, Keesler Field, Mississippi as a flying instructor. I have been assigned to the Emergency Rescue School as an instructor since March of this year.

On 27 November, 1944, I left Keesler Field at about 1400, C. W. T. with a student crew including pilot and co-pilot in OA-10 #343842, for a practice rendezvous mission. Three OA-10 airplanes were to fly at assigned headings for 1 hour and 30 minutes and at that time to turn to rendezvous point at Breton Island in the Delta Area of the Gulf of Mexico. The three ships met at Breton Island at about 1720 C.W.T. and took up the course to Keesler Field at about 1725. My ship, 343842, departed the island at about 1727 by the navigator's log, with 343845 flying formation on right wing to me. The third ship departed singly a few minutes prior in the direction of Keesler Field.

At about 1745, C.W.T., by the navigator's log, the radar technician of the student crew, Cpl. Charles C. Raschiatore called the pilot on inter-phone and reported a spot of green sea marker in the water almost below us. We were flying at about an altitude of 600 feet. We immediately circled down and to the left and could see some object in the water about 100 feet to the north of the sea marker. We circled again and lower and observed that the object was a man in a rubber life jacket who waved recognition to us. As we circled to land, we temporarily lost the man to view, so came in over him again. The condition of the sea being 4 to 5 foot swells with occasional white caps and the sun being just above the horizon, made it very difficult to keep the man in sight. We made the second low run over the man, and knowing that we could not keep him in sight while on a landing run, I landed as close to the man as I could judge the turns. When on the water, we could not see the man and began to taxi in the direction we thought him to be. The second OA-10 circled the man and dipped over him to give us his position. We began to taxi to the indicated position when I noticed that our ship was taking a great deal of water in the forward section. Because of the considerable amount of water coming into the ship, and not being certain where it was coming in, I immediately applied power and took off. Finding that the water was coming in the forward gun blister, I temporarily covered the leak and made ready to land again. The OA-10 that was circling did not know our difficulty, and landed near the man, after we had taken off. He was some distance from the man in the water, and as we had the man in sight, and were very low and at just the right angle to keep the man in sight and land very close to him, we thought that we could get to him quicker than the ship already in the water, as we did not know

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whether or not he had the man in sight. We immediately landed and taxied directly to the man and threw him a line. The first attempt, he failed to receive the line and we made a tight circle and this time passed the line to him. The man either accidentally or intentionally fastened the line to his leg and as we still had some forward motion, the man was temporarily pulled under the surface. The student co-pilot, who had been in the blister of the OA-10, then went into the water to assist the man on the rope in anyway that he could. By this time, I had reached the blister of the ship, and the student pilot had stopped our engines. We succeeded in getting the man aboard. He was very cold and frightened and unable to speak clearly. His wet clothing was removed and dry clothing put on him and the Aldis lamp used to help warm him. We were unable to find out from him for several minutes who he was, or how he happened to be in the water.

While we were preparing to rescue this man, members of our crew had reported at least one and probably two more spots of marker dye in this vicinity. They were unable to see anyone in the water near them, however. It is possible that intership communication with our wing ship been available, we could have remained on the water and by his direction from the air, investigated closely at least one of the spots of dye before absolute darkness. However, our take-off from the rough water in absolute darkness would have been hazardous. Assuming that our wing ship would circle the position until we could contact assistance, we headed for Keesler Field.

Shortly after leaving the position, we saw a B-24 coming to the area and a few minutes later, a crash boat going in that direction. We did not contact the B-24 or the crash boat.

We landed at Keesler Field and returned the man over to medical authorities and the circumstances were immediately reported to the Base Operations Officer.

Richard E. Hathaway
 RICHARD E. HATHAWAY,
 Captain, Air Corps.
 Witness.

Ross D. Praker
 ROSS D. PRAKER,
 2nd Lt., Air Corps.

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HEADQUARTERS
AAF EMERGENCY RESCUE SCHOOL
KEESLER FIELD, MISSISSIPPI

8 December 1944

S T A T E M E N T

I, JAMES F. LUCKETT, P/O, Air Corps, was riding in capacity of co-pilot on ship #842 when a green sea marker was sighted. I was in the blister at the time because the instructor pilot was at the controls.

After we made the water landing to pick the man a rope was thrown out the blister. Somehow he tangled the rope on his left ankle and due to the speed of the plane at the moment was dragged under the water about 100 yards. On sighting him again I saw he was under the water slightly and head down. I jumped from the blister and held him above until we were able to get him in the blister. Due to his condition we were unable to find out if he was the only one out there or not. This being so we proceeded back to the home base, Keesler Field, Miss. and he was turned over to the Medical Dept.

James F. Lockett
JAMES F. LUCKETT,
P/O., Air Corps,
Student Pilot.

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REPORT OF RESCUE

On November 27, 1944, at 1728 hours, plane No. 842 piloted by Lt. Donald G. Rynne and navigated by me, W/O Thomas L. Stanley, Jr., proceeded from Breton Island on a course of 011°. At 1745 hours a message was sent to the pilot from Sgt. Isidor E. Barrack stating that green sea marker had been sighted. Upon receipt of this message Lt. Rynne turned and flew low over the marker and found that a man clad in flying clothing was in the water.

Lt. Fraker, the instructor pilot, took over and landed but lost the marker during the landing. The water was choppy, making it impossible to find the sea marker while on the water. We took off again, located the sea marker and landed. When the plane reached the man, Lt. Rynne made tight circles around him while the enlisted men in the after section threw out a rope. On the third turn around, the man caught the rope. Due to the speed of the plane and the manner in which the rope was entangled around the man, he was pulled under water for some distance. When it appeared as though the plane would not stop at once I started pulling the man in. With the help of other crew members, the man was lifted into the blister. His wet clothing was replaced with dry clothing.

We took off from the water at 1810 and headed for Keesler Field.

From Breton Island to the scene of the rescue we were making a track good of 011°, a true air speed of 97 knots and a ground speed of 88 knots. The wind was from 015° at 8 knots. All of the computations were made on this basis. At the time of the rescue we were seventeen minutes out from Breton Island. At a speed of 88 knots this would make the position of rescue 25 miles from Breton Island on a course of 011°. Coordinates 29° 53' N 89° 03' W.

Upon arriving at Keesler Field the coordinates of the place of rescue were given to Lt. Col. Steffer, the base operations Officer.

/s/ Thomas L. Stanley, Jr.
Thomas L. Stanley, Jr.
W/O A.C.

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NCG 2024
(June 1946)

REPORT OF ASSISTANCE

Unit **BAS, Biloxi, Miss** Particular activity **02-63-44 (AVR-6)** District **Eighth Naval** Serial No. **7-45**
November 27, 1944
(Date of casualty)

Other units assisting Army Crash Boats and places	*SOURCE-0	*NATURE-1
Vessel assisted Crew of aircraft	*DEGREE-2	*EQUIPMENT-3
Home port Great Bend, Kansas	Nationality (4)	
Cargo Military	Rig (5)	
Bound from Great Bend, Kansas	Class (6)	
To Cuba Days out	Tonnage (7)	
Names and addresses of—	*Classification of assistance (major or miscellaneous) (8)	
Master	Persons on board:	
Owner U. S. Army	Crew 12 men (Army) (901)	
Casualty:	Passengers (902)	
Nature Parachute jump	Persons actually saved from drowning:	
Cause Engine failure (See footnote 6)	Crew 2 men (Army) (1001)	
Time and source of first information By phone	Passengers (1002)	
from Biloxi Air Station 1800H	Persons rescued from positions of peril:	
Time district commander was notified	Crew One (Army) (1101)	
Date and hour proceeded 11-27-44, 18:30	Passengers (1102)	
Arrived 0005H/ 28th Distance 53 miles	Persons lost:	
Where found Chicot Point Light (Local name)	Crew 9 men (Army) (1201)	
Lat. 29°44' N Long. 89°12'30" W	Passengers (1202)	
Was vessel in danger of extensive damage or loss?	Coast Guard crew:	
Weather: NE 2	Injured None (1301)	
Wind 56 T Sea (2) NE	Lost (1302)	
Temperature 56 F Visibility 3	Value of property involved:	
Equipment used: CO-63044 AVR-6	Vessel None (1401)	
Boats	Cargo None (1402)	
Search life and R.T/C.W.	Value of property lost:	
3 red parachute flares	Vessel None (1501)	
Breeches buoy	Cargo (1502)	
Vehicle None	Persons succored (1601)	
Ordnance None	Persons resuscitated One man (1702)	
Other Life nets and buoys	Miles towed None (1904)	
	Coast Guard property damaged (description):	
	None	
	Value 727 (2005)	

*This line to be filled in by headquarters.

Was service equipment satisfactory? Yes If not, make full report and recommendation for improvement in a separate communication.

REMARKS

Rescued two Army men from Chandeleur Sound, 3 miles 73° P.S.C. off Chicot Point Light after being in water for six hours.

(1) Names of men, 1st Lt. Bigelow, Fred H., Service No. 0725042, Army Air Force, Great Bend, Kansas, taken aboard 0015R with mild state of shock, after being in water for six hours. At 0200, resting well.
(2) Jones, William E., Service No. 14202825, Corporal, Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas. Exposure with shock. Unconscious upon rescue from Chandeleur Sound, same position, gave two minutes of Respiration, regained shallow breathing. Regained consciousness at 0200. Kept both men warm with hot water bottles and blankets. Upon arrival at the dock, time 0315R, both men delivered to Army ambulance. Both men resting easy.

Used 400 gallons of gas (91) Octane.

Prepared by James E. Wallace

Rank C.E.M.

E. J. GUYDAM

(Commanding officer)

Rank Commander, USCG

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reports shall be submitted in all cases of actual or attempted assistance.
2. Reports shall be typewritten and numbered serially for each fiscal year. Reports of assistance to, or searches for, derelicts shall be similarly numbered in a separate series.
3. Under "Remarks" give an account of operations, including list of deaths or serious injuries, any unusual delays, difficulties, outstanding performances of duty, and details of professional or public interest. Use additional sheets if necessary.
4. The numbers after certain words are code numbers for headquarters' use only.
5. "Persons actually saved from drowning" include those who in all probability would have been drowned if Coast Guard assistance had not been rendered. "Persons rescued from positions of peril" include those whose lives were endangered by possible drowning or other cause.
6. State opinion as to whether or not casualty was partly or wholly due to unseaworthiness, inadequacy or lack of equipment, or incompetency of personnel, and, if so, elaborate in "Remarks."

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-5228

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CG-65004

Higdon, Fred E. (072027), 1st Lt., Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas.

Rescued by. 0030, 11-25-44

On: Reported: Set 6 hours with mild state of shock. Ascorbic acid 100mg administered at 0240, and 1 gr. morphine sulfate injection. Roping well at 0300.

Jones, William E. (1120225), Corporal, Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas.

Rescued by. 0030, 11-25-44

On: Reported: 1st shock. Unconscious upon rescue. Given 2 minutes of respiration. Heat applied with hot water bottle immediately. Breathing shallow. Regained consciousness at 0200. 1 gr. morphine sulfate injection at 0215 and ascorbic acid 100mg intravenously at 0230. Roping well at 0300.

Both men delivered to Army ambulance at app. 0315.

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STATEMENTS OF AIRDROME WITNESSES

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STATEMENTKeesler Field, Miss.
29 November 1944

At approximately 1730, 27 November 1944, I saw a B-23 airplane coming in for a landing. I saw that the #1 engine was missing from mount. Bombardier and Co-pilot were missing from their stations when plane pulled up in parking position on the line. I assumed Pilot had bailed out the crew. I entered ship and asked the Pilot if he wanted me to kill the engines for him. He said, "Yes". I found all mixture controls locked in the auto rich position. I killed the three running engines according to Technical Order 02-1-29 and discovered that #3 engine had overheated and continued to run. It stopped in approximately one minute. #3 engine was smoking badly, I climbed out Pilot's window and made investigation as to fire. I would not permit firemen to turn water on engine. I got back in cockpit to make a final check. I turned battery switch on to raise the flaps, Captain Krug said, "Your booster pumps are running". I found that #1 engine pump was inoperative, due to knob being twisted off. I found fuel shut-off valves in on position on all four engines. I checked CO2 fire extinguisher in case #3 engine fired up and found both bottles expanded on #1 selector valve. Ignition switch was in "on" position for all four engines. I checked tank #1 for fuel and found it empty.

Robert H. Danley
ROBERT H. DANLEY, 6926104
M/Sgt., Line Chief.

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STATEMENT OF CONTROL TOWER OPERATOR

I, Cpl. James J. Back, ASN 15097582, was on duty in B Position in the Keesler Field Tower on 27 November 1944.

At approximately 1715C we received a call from Army 447 giving position as 50 miles S-SW of Keesler Field, advising that he had lost one engine, that the crew had bailed out, and calling for an emergency landing at this Field.

Lt. Col. Stoffer and the Operations Dispatcher were notified by me thru the intercom. Then I phoned the Crash Crew and told them to stand by. I was unable to contact Crash Boats, so put out a blind call giving position. Then I notified the Keesler Field Telephone Operator to start a Crash Procedure alarm for both on and off the airfield. Then a blind call was put out to three CA-10s on a practice search, giving the location where the crew bailed out and instructing them to proceed to that location. This was all logged at approximately 1720.

About five minutes later we received a call from Army 447 to determine if our Field was the one to the east or to the west, and we told him it was the easternmost Field. The aircraft was spotted in the direction of Gulfport, entering our pattern on the down wind leg for a landing on Runway 31. At this time we discovered that the plane was a B-29. Until then we did not know type of aircraft, nor did we want to bother him with another call to find out. He was cleared and let to land as he turned on the base leg. The aircraft bounced quite high in landing but was kept well under control.

James J. Back
JAMES J. BACK - ASN 15097582
Cpl. - Keesler Field, Miss.

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STATEMENT OF B-29 ENGINEERING OFFICER

and

UNSATISFACTORY REPORT FORM 54

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STATEMENT

8 December 1944

TO: Keesler Field Accident Officer, Keesler Field, Miss.

1. The undersigned was directed to come to this station and supervise the dis-assembly of the #1 Engine Nacelle of B-29, #42-24447, and to inspect the wing panel thoroughly before re-installing a new engine. The following pertinent information is submitted:

a. Engine type, R-3350-23A, Ser No. 43-149573, purchased 6 July 1944 from Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Paterson, N.J. and installed on B-29 42-6404.

b. Engine removed at 324:10 hours due to valve broken in #3 cylinder, also ignition trouble, and time expired.

c. Engine sent to OCASC, 10-21-44, and given major overhaul. Reason: External Failure. Engine equipped with complete set of Cylinder Air Blast Baffles and standard Piston and Cylinder assemblies. Total Time - 324:00 hrs.

d. Engine installed on B-29 42-24447, 11-16-44. Total hours since overhaul, 20:05 hrs.

e. After inspecting the remainder of nacelle, the following items were noted:

- (1) Fire burned up and to the rear following both fuel and oil lines. The fire followed oil line to the tank which was charred black. The fire followed fuel line to a point approx. 6 inches outside of nacelle on leading edge of wing. Fire did not damage wing spar.
- (2) Only upper nacelle was burned. Lower part of nacelle was apparently ripped off by weight of the engine and that part of nacelle that was attached to engine when it fell off. Oil cooler and oil cooler section was completely wiped away but the wing area where oil cooler section attaches was not burned. The remaining rivets and small torn pieces of metal that were a component part of the oil cooler section were not burned or overheated.

RESTRICTED

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99-

727

RESTRICTED

f. From all indications, the fire was started by broken, ruptured, loose, or deteriorated fuel line near the engine.

g. #2 engine was found to have a leaking carburetor on 29 Nov. 44. Pilot said all carburetors were given a pressure check before departing from Great Bend. The carburetors will sometimes start leaking after sitting overnight.

h. #3 engine was found to have a bad right magneto. Upon removal of cover plate, it was found to be completely saturated with oil.

i. #4 engine; positive cut-off of carburetor was inoperative allowing fuel to flow thru the carburetor with mixture control in idle cut-off.

Robert E. Miller
Robert E. Miller
1st Lt., A. C.
Aircraft Maint. Officer
Great Bend Army Air Field

RESTRICTED

-100-

WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 54
(Revised 2-18-43)

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES

UNSATISFACTORY REPORT

(See AAF Reg. 15-54 for information on proper use of this form)

TO BE FILLED IN BY STATION	
STATION SERIAL No.	DATE SUBMITTED
44-145	12-11-44

LEAVE BLANK		
A. S. C. SERIAL No.	REFER TO	CLASS

STATION Keesler Field, Miss.		ORGANIZATION 4503d AAF Base Unit, Service Gp (Sp), Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas	
SUBJECT OF REPORT Property Class—Name		Manufacturer AAF Order or Shipping No.	
AIRCRAFT—Model & AAF Serial No. B-29-27 42-24447		ENGINE—Model & AAF Serial No. B-3350-23A 149573	
UNIT OR ACCESSORY—Type, Model and Serial No.		Flying Time Since 687:30	
AIRCRAFT REPORTS ONLY LAST D. I. R.—Depot New		Total Flying Time	
ENGINE REPORTS ONLY LAST OVERHAUL—Depot OCATSC		Hours Since 20:05	
Depots and Hours At Each Previous Overhaul OCATSC 324:00		Part Drawing, Serial and Specification No.	
Name		Inspector's No. or Identification	
Time in Use	Quantity on Hand	Quantity Known Defective	No. Previous Failures
Indicate by "X" Disposition of Exhibit		Manufacturer	
☐ Photographed and Prints Enclosed ☐ Held for Instructions ☐ Sent Under Separate Cover ☐ Sent in Attached Package ☐ Repaired and Returned to Service ☒ Disposed of (Explain Below.) ☐ To Overhaul Facility (INITIALS)			

GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS, PROBABLE CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW:
(Use Only Applicable Spaces Above—Avoid Unnecessary Repetition)

EXPEDITE

DETAILS:

While on a routine training mission fire occurred in #1 nacelle. The engine burned off completely and fell into the Gulf of Mexico. The fire burned the upper rear of the nacelle, following both fuel and oil lines. It followed the oil line to the tank, charring it black; it followed the fuel line to a point approximately six inches outside the nacelle on the leading edge of wing. The wing spar was not damaged. Only the upper nacelle burned; however, the lower nacelle was apparently ripped off by weight of the engine and fell with the engine. Oil cooler and oil cooler section were completely torn away, but wing area where oil cooler section attaches was not burned.

PROBABLE CAUSES:

From all indications, the fire was started by broken, loose, ruptured, or deteriorated fuel line near the engine.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.


RE E. MILLER
1st Lt. A.C.
Acft Maint Officer

RESTRICTED

ROUTING

SEND ORIGINAL AND TWO COPIES DIRECT TO COMMANDING GENERAL,
HQ. AIR SERVICE COMMAND, PATTERSON FIELD, FAIRFIELD, OHIO.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 30-54612-1

B-29 FLIGHT PLAN					ZAF FORM 334	
SQUADRON NO <u>28</u>		A. COMMANDER <u>J. J. [unclear]</u>		FROM <u>1100</u> VIA <u>1000</u>		
GROUP NO <u>18</u>		FLIGHT ENG. <u>11-24</u>		VIA <u> </u> VIA <u> </u>		
AIRPLANE NO <u>447</u>		DATE <u>11-27-44</u>		VIA <u> </u> TO <u> </u>		
FUEL-WING TANKS <u>5600</u>		BOMBS-FRONT <u>1000</u> REAR <u>1800</u>		FUEL EST. <u>6776</u>		
FUEL-CENTER TANKS <u>1120</u>		AMMUNIT-50 CAL <u>2000</u> 20 MM <u> </u>		RESERVE EST. <u>1020</u>		
FUEL BOMB TANKS <u>1280</u>		BASIC WT. EMPTY <u> </u>		FUEL DENSITY <u>6</u>		
TOTAL FUEL <u>8000</u>		GROSS WEIGHT <u>132132</u>		GROUND TEMP <u> </u>		
FLIGHT CONDITIONS (NO WIND)						
CONDITIONS	ALT.	L.A.S.	DIST.	TIME	POWER SETS	
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
RADAR EXT. <u>2</u> MI FROM TARGET		BOMB DOORS OPEN				
RADAR EXT. <u> </u> MI FROM BASE		MIN <u> </u> MIL				
SCHEMATIC FLIGHT PLAN						



100-11365

FUNCTION	CLK TIME A TIME SETTING		TOTAL TIME	PRESSURE ALTITUDE		TEMP C	I.A.S.		T.A.S.		COWL PLANS	RPM		MP		MIX		FUEL FLOW		FUEL USED		FUEL REMAINING		GROSS WEIGHT		DIST	TOTAL OBT
	FP	A		FP	A		FP	A	FP	A		FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A	FP	A		
1	FP	A	1	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
2	FP	A	2	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
3	FP	A	3	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
4	FP	A	4	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
5	FP	A	5	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
6	FP	A	6	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
7	FP	A	7	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
8	FP	A	8	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
9	FP	A	9	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
10	FP	A	10	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
11	FP	A	11	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
12	FP	A	12	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
13	FP	A	13	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
14	FP	A	14	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
15	FP	A	15	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172

FLIGHT NOTES -

FUEL WILL BE IN GPH
ENTRIES WILL BE MADE EACH HOUR
ON AT POWER SETTING CHANGES)

ENGINE OPERATION RECORD

2AF FORM 334-A

SQUADRON NO. <u>12</u>		AIRPLANE COMM. <u>12</u>		FROM <u>12</u> VIA <u>12</u>	
GROUND NO. <u>12</u>		FLIGHT ENGINEER <u>12</u>		VIA <u>12</u> VIA <u>12</u>	
AIRPLANE NO. <u>12</u>		DATE <u>12-12-12</u>		VIA <u>12</u> TO <u>12</u>	

OIL PRESS REAR		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
OIL PRESS NOSE		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
CYL HEAD TEMP		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
MANIFOLD PRESS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
R.P.M.		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
COWL FLAPS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
MIXTURE		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
CARB AIR TEMP		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
FUEL PRESS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
INTER-COOLER FLAPS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
OIL INLET TEMP		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
GEN VOLTS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
GEN AMPS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

RESTRICTED

-106-1

16-40171-3 GPO

WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF FORM NO. 23
(REVISED AUG. 15, 1945)

ARMY AIR FORCES
AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL REPORT

OPERATIONS OFFICE **ARMY AIR BASE**
ADDRESS **GREAT BEND, KANSAS**

DATE **12/27/46**

PILOT'S NAME **B HAMMOND, E. W.** RANK **1st Lt.** HOME STATION **DGE** ORGANIZATION **19th Bomb. Gp** AIRCRAFT NUMBER **447**

NAME, INITIALS, RANK, HOME STATION OF OTHER OCCUPANTS

GREENAW, E. H., 2d Lt.	Johnson, E. C., Cpl.
CLARK, J. C., 2d Lt.	JONES, G. E., Cpl.
BIGLOW, F. H., 1st Lt.	KENNEDY, G. J., Cpl.
WELLEY, J. F., 2d Lt.	SCHAMBERLAIN, J. B., Cpl.
RIFE, R. D., Pfc.	WILLARD, E. F., Capt.
LITTLE, E. H., Pfc.	

The weight and balance status of this aircraft is identical with that shown on Form F filed at DGE Field on 11/27/46 at 1005.5. 10. 15.

C WEATHER DATA EXISTING LOCAL

EXISTING ROUTE

DESTINATION (LATEST) TIME

ALTERNATE (LATEST) TIME

FORECASTS (ESTIMATED FLIGHT TIME PLUS 2 HOURS)

ROUTE

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY *John W. Ross*
JOHN W. ROSS,
CWO, USA,
Asst. Operations Officer.

DESTINATION

ALTERNATE

WINDS ALOFT
GIVE ALT DIR VEL
AS PILOT REQUESTS

AAF FORM 23A REQUIRED ☐ NOT REQUIRED ☐ FORECASTER TIME

ALTIMETER SETTINGS
LOCAL
DESTINATION
ALTERNATE
RESET ALTIMETER BEFORE APPROACH

FLIGHT D PLAN (PILOT COMPLETES) RADIO CALLS

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT **B-29** PILOT (LAST NAME ONLY) **Hammond** POINT OF DEPARTURE **DGE**

1 ALT 8000	2 ALT 12,000	3 ALT 20,000	4 ALT 8,000
CFR ROUTE Direct	CFR ROUTE Direct	CFR ROUTE Direct	CFR ROUTE Direct
IFR ROUTE El Dorado, Ark.	IFR ROUTE Gulfport	IFR ROUTE Batista, Cuba	IFR ROUTE DGE

AIRPORT OF FIRST INTENDED LANDING **DGE** TRUE AIR SPEED **200** **4494** **7045**

PROPOSED TAKE OFF TIME **08:30** EST. TIME ENROUTE **1 1/2** ALTERNATE AIRPORT **GL** HOURS OF FUEL (CRUISING) **18** INSTRUMENT RATING **white** FLIGHT PRIORITY **3-2**

REMARKS: SHOW FIXES WHICH WILL BE REPORTED WHILE ON INSTRUMENT FLIGHT

Tulsa Radio **Texarkana Radio** **New Orleans Radio**

Batista Radio

PILOT'S SIGNATURE **EUGENE W. HAMMOND**

TOWER FREQUENCIES **317 KC** **376 KC** WEATHER CODE RECEIVED ☒ YES ☐ NO TO DESTINATION **3,000** DEST. TO ALTERNATE **200**

COMMAND PILOT ☐ SENIOR PILOT ☐ CONTRACT PILOT OF ☐ CARGO AIRCRAFT ☐ PILOT

E FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION

SUBMITTED TO TIME BY

TIME APPROVAL RECEIVED CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED

CLEARING AUTHORITY **-109-**

INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANSMITTED TO PILOT OR TOWER BY: ACTUAL TAKE OFF TIME

G ARRIVAL REPORT

THIS COPY TO BE GIVEN TO PILOT. Pilot will complete "Arrival Report" and present to line crewing aircraft, for his information. Line crewing aircraft will then forward to the operations office. This station will be responsible for the aircraft.


DATE AND TIME OF ARRIVAL **12/27/46** **10:05** **10:05** **10:05**

WHERE PILOT CAN BE REACHED AT THIS STATION **10:05** **10:05** **10:05** **10:05**

REMARKS


LINE CREWMAN'S SIGNATURE

*lower front view
#1 nacelle*




KFPL (46-224) (856) (KF-1144-10) (1-27-44)
Fire in #1 Engine on B-29# 42-24487











30 November 1944

FLYING SAFETY

WINSTON SALEM, N. C.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
ARMY AIR FORCES,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTN: FLYING SAFETY

FBN/rb

APAFS 1499 M PD REFERRING TO B DASH 29 ACCIDENT CMA AIRPLANE #42 DASH 24447
KEESLER FIELD 27 NOVEMBER 44 PRELIMINARY AIRPLANE ACCIDENT REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT CMA ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE INFORMATION FROM BSO ADVISES COLON QUOTE THE STATUS
OF THE CREW THIS DATE PILOT NO INJURY CMA 5 CREW MEMBERS FUSED CMA ONLY INJURY
EXPOSURE AND ^{Now} ~~CREW~~ NEARLY RECOVERED CMA ONE CREW MEMBER INJURY FATAL CMA 7 CREW
MEMBERS MISSING PD ALL AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT READY TO CONTINUE SEARCH WHEN WEATHER
PERMITS PD CEILING NOW 400 FEET PD 14 BOATS NOW ENGAGED IN SEARCH CMA ALL LOCAL
FISHING BOATS ALERTED PD IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE CAUSE OF FIRE FROM EXAMINATION
OF AIRPLANE PD INTERVIEW OF PILOT REVEALS THAT MOTOR CAUGHT FIRE CMA PROPELLER
COULD NOT BE WEATHERED CAUSING VIBRATION WHICH THREW THE AIRPLANE OUT OF CONTROL
PD THE CREW BAILED OUT PD MOTOR WAS SHAKEN OFF CMA PILOT AGAIN RECOVERED CONTROL
OF THE AIRPLANE AND FLEW INTO KEESLER FIELD ALONE PD SIMILAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING
B DASH 29 AIRPLANE WAS OCCURRED CMA AIRPLANE NOW AT MAXWELL FIELD CMA ACCIDENT BEING
INVESTIGATED PD IN THIS CASE TWO MOTORS FAILED CMA CREW BAILED OUT AND PILOT BROUGHT
AIRPLANE IN ALONE PD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW WHEN DATA OBTAINED UNQUOTE
PD SIGNED WILBY END

PRICE

Certified by:

THOMAS P. HALL, LT. COL., AIR CORPS
Chief of Region

PS V WS NR2

FROM PRICE CO HQ AFAFS WINSTONSALEM NCAR 301346Z

TO CG AAF WASHINGTON 25 DC

ATTN FLYING SAFETY

GRNC

AFAFS 1499-M PD REFERRING TO B DASH 29 ACCIDENT CMA AIRPLANE 42 DASH
24447 KEESLER FIELD 27 NOVEMBER 44 PRELIMINARY AIRPLANE ACCIDENT
REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT CMA ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE INFORMATION
FROM RSO ADVISES COLON QUOTE THE STATUS OF THE CREW THIS DATE PILOT
NO INJURY CMA 3 CREW MEMBERS FOUND CMA ONLY INJURY EXPOSURE AND NOW
NEARLY RECOVERED CMA ONE CREW MEMBER INJURY FATAL CMA 7 CREW MEMBERS
MISSING PD ALL AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT READY TO CONTINUE SEARCH WHEN
WEATHER PERMITS PD CEILING NOW 400 FEET PD 14 BOATS NOW ENGAGED IN
SEARCH CMA ALL LOCAL FISHING BOATS ALERTED PD IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
CAUSE OF FIRE FROM EXAMINATION OF AIRPLANE PD INTERVIEW OF PILOT
REVEALS THAT MOTOR CAUGHT FIRE CMA PROPELLER COULD NOT BE FEATHERED
CAUSING VIBRATION WHICH THREW THE AIRPLANE OUT OF CONTROL PD THE CREW
BAILED OUT PD MOTOR WAS SHAKEN OFF CMA PILOT AGAIN RECOVERED CONTROL
OF THE AIRPLANE AND RXXXXXX AND FLEW INTO KEESLER FIELD ALONE PD
SIMILAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING B DASH 29 AIRPLANE HAS OCCURRED CMA AIRPLANE
NOW AT MAXWELL FIELD CMA ACCIDENT BEING INVESTIGATED PD IN THIS CASE
TWO MOTORS FAILED CMA CREW BAILED OUT AND PILOT BROUGHT AIRPLANE IN
ALONE PD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW WHEN SAME OBTAINED UNQUOTE
PD SIGNED WILEY END

1408Z

NE K..

R 2 1410Z MH

-119- 727

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF REGIONS

	LT. COL. BALL		MAJOR LAGE		CAPTAIN ENVALL
	LT. COL. GARLOW		MAJOR CORNINGTON		SUSPENSE
	MAJOR WILEY		CAPTAIN FLETCHER		FILE
	MAJOR LANE		CAPTAIN LANE		

REMARKS:

Our file only

4235:11-440FS

COPY

COPY

COPY

W SAL 361 V BILOXY 365 WRT /P/ WD
 FROM GOOLRICK CO KEESLER FIELD MISS
 TO CG AAF WINSTON SALEM NC
 ATT CHIEF OPS GRC
 PRELIMINARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

280600Z

A. 27 NOVEMBER 1944, 1700C, 38 MILES SOUTH OF KEESLER FIELD, MISSISSIPPI

B B-29, 42-24447, 93 BOMB SQ 19 BOMB GP ARMY AIR BASE GREAT BEND KANSAS NO. ONE ENGINE
 TORE LOOSE DROPPING INTO SEA

C EUGENE W HAMMOND 1ST LT 93 BOMB SQ 19 BOMB GP 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2ND AIR FORCE, ARMY
 AIR BASE GREAT BEND KANSAS, NONE, NONE,

D SAME

E AC EDWIN H. GRESHAM, 2ND LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2ND AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

B FRED H. BIGELOW, 1ST LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

N JAMES C CLARK, 2D LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

BB JOHN KELLEY, 2D LT 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

O. STACY F HOLLAND, CAPT. 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

R. ROBERT D RIFE, PFC 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2ND AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

V JOHN B SCHAEVERLEY, CPL 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE YES, UNKNOWN

G RICHARD M LITTLE PFC 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

G WILLIAM K. JONES, CPL, 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2ND AIR FORCE YES, UNKNOWN

G, NED C. JOHNSON, CPL, 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

G, GEORGE J. KENNEDY, CPL, 21 BOMBER COMMAND 2D AIR FORCE, YES, UNKNOWN

F NUMBER ONE ENGINE CAUGHT FIRE AT 12000 FEET CREW UTILIZED BOTH EXTINGUISHERS AND
 UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO FEATHER PROPELLER. PILOT STATES CRAFT BECAME DIFFICULT TO
 CONTROL AND HE ORDERED THE CREW TO ABANDON SHIP AFTER ASCERTAINING THEY WERE ALL EQUIPPED
 WITH LIFE VESTS AND NOTIFYING KEESLER FIELD BY RADIO AND JETTISONING HIS BOMBS AND
 BOMB BAY FUEL TANKS. AFTER ELEVENTH MAN JUMPED AND AS THE PILOT PREPARED TO FOLLOW
 THE BURNING ENGINE TORE FREE FROM THE PLANE AND THE FIRE SUBSIDED. PILOT WAS ABLE TO
 REGAIN GOOD CONTROL AND CIRCLED SCENE AND NOTED DESCENDING CREW WELL GROUPED. PILOT
 ADVISED KEESLER TOWER THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT NORMAL LANDING AT THIS STATION WHICH HE
 SINGLY ACCOMPLISHED. SEA SEARCH WAS DIRECTED TO AREA WHICH PILOT BELIEVED SURVIVORS
 WOULD BE FOUND BUT KEESLER OA-10A ON NAVIGATION MISSION NOTED DYE MARKERS AND ON
 INVESTIGATION ACCOMPLISHED RESCUE OF CPL NED JOHNSON AT DUSK AND GAVE ACCURATE LOCATION
 30 MILES DISTANT FROM ORIGINAL POINT. THIRTEEN RESCUE BOATS ARE IN AREA WHICH IS
 NEARLY LAND LOCKED AND WATER TESTS SIXTY DEGREES FAHRENHEIT. EXTENSIVE AIR SEARCH HAS
 BEEN ORGANIZED

G NUMBER ONE NACELLE STRUCTURE

H. NONE

I GREAT BEND TO FREEMASON ISLAND TO HAVANA TO GREAT BEND

J. BOMBING AND NAVIGATION

K. CAVU WATER SURFACE 18 DEGREES 8 KNOTS

L. NONE

M. AFACG REPORTED 20-18-1120

of what is known at the present time. Right now,

Preliminary Report that Col. Stauber sent is very complete, and there's no need to go through the names or anything. It is about the sum and substance. The pilot is all right, they have since found three men alive and they are doing all right - they are almost recovered now. One man was found dead - that leaves 7 unaccounted for. There is a very extensive search going on now, but it's hampered somewhat by the weather. There is a ceiling here of about 400 feet and out over the Gulf, it's almost down to the water, but as soon as it breaks, they have a fleet of airplanes ready to take off. At the present time, there are a number of boats - some 14 I believe - boats out at the present time and the fishermen around here have been requested to keep an eye out.

Has the cause been definitely established?

No, as far as they can determine at the present time, it appears to have been caused by gasoline. Whether the engine caught fire and the gas line burned or the other way around can't quite be told. The engine is completely off the airplane and there's only ~~xxxx~~ just the stub of the nacelle on the wing now.

What further investigation are they making to determine the cause?

They're tearing down that section of the wing and looking back ~~into~~ the wing to see whether they could possibly trace any malfunction there, but that's about all that can be done. The pilot statement is completed as far as we could see, and as far as the crew men, there is nothing they can tell because all they saw was the fire. They couldn't tell where it started or anything about it. Now we had a very similar one ~~xxxx~~ at Maxwell that we're going back over to look at. The case at Maxwell Field - the pilot brought the airplane in after the crew jumped - no injuries to the crew but the engine is still on it, and

When did that accident happen at Maxwell?

Yesterday. It had a fire in No. 1 and they couldn't get it out, and while he was trying to get it out, No. 2 started acting up too, so the crew bailed out, but he brought it in with 2 engines.

What happened to the engine at Keesler? Did it come right off the airplane.

What happened - the engine caught fire was burning very violently the crew bailed out, and the prop could not be feathered and the pilot was just about ~~xx~~ ready to leave himself when the engine fell ~~xxx~~ off and as it fell off, he regained control of the airplane. At that time, it was almost unmanageable because of the vibration and the wind resistance there.

-121-

Col. Stauffer.

I received a wire last night - a TWX - it's 1430-1 "Request that all available information in regard to injury to personnel" Now I was under the impression that our supplemental covered everything. Perhaps you weren't in receipt of that.

I don't think we were, Colonel.

Now can we disregard that.

That is right - you may disregard that request from us, because I'm sure the supplemental wire covered everything.

I added on to the supplemental - deviated a little bit - I added although the doctor said they were suffering from exposure, condition was good. In fact, this morning the three men ^{that} were picked out of the water are practically normal - they're just holding them over there. Put condition good - I think that would be self-explanatory.

That is quite sufficient, Colonel, you may disregard that second wire from us.

On the fatal, you didn't it said probably exposure or drowning.
Was that

That's quite sufficient.

Until such time as the C. O. here abandons the search, we'll furnish you supplementals on it. Any new development whatsoever.

That will be fine, Colonel.

-122-

"RESTRICTED"

26 Feb 1945

73

OPS ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORTS

AFAPS I

WINSTON-SALEM 1, N. C

Commanding Officer
Army Air Base
Great Bend, Kansas

Sent in clear

X

CAMter

AFAPS 1155 I PERIOD REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE
CONCERNING CAPTAIN STACY P HOLLAND CMA ASN ZERO DASH SEVEN TWO FIVE ZERO SIX FOUR
CMA AND SIX MISSING CREWMEN INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT IN B DASH TWO NINE CMA NUMBER
FOUR TWO DASH TWO FOUR FOUR FOUR SEVEN CMA DATE 27 NOVEMBER 1944 PD SIGNED
PRICE END

ARNOLD

Certified By

J. E. COLLETTE, Major, Air Corps
Executive, Accident Analysis Division

"RESTRICTED"

Qy #2

UOHX V UAWS NR14 WD P P

-T- GREAT BEND KAN 53

FROM ARNOLD CG HQ AFAPS WINSTONSALEM NCAR 271429Z

TO COMMANDING OFFICER ARMY AIR BASE GREAT BEND KANSAS

GRNC

/RESTRICTED/

AFAPS 1155-I PERIOD REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE
AVAILABLE CONCERNING CAPTAIN STACY F HOLLAND CMA ASN ZERO DASH SEVEN
TWO FIVE ZERO SIX FOUR CMA AND SIX MISSING CREWMEN INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT
IN B DASH TWO NINE CMA NUMBER FOUR TWO DASH TWO FOUR FOUR FOUR SEVEN
CMA DATE 27 NOVEMBER 1944 PD SIGNED PRICE END

1451Z

AS

2947

FEB 28 8 12 AM 1945

A4A(E)

05

File

ADD

DB131

DB135

UAW5 V UOR475 MU

FROM RICE COAF AAF GREAT BEND KANSAS 272132Z

TO COMMANDING GENERAL 40 AFAPS WINSTONSALEM NCAR

CRNC

SP CP1226 PD

CITE AFAPS 1133 DASH 1 DTD 27 FEB 45 PD SEARCH FOR THE FOL NAMED EM AND

OF CMA MISSING FROM ACFT ACCIDENT OVER GULF OF MEXICO 27 NOVEMBER 44

CMA ABANDONED REPEAT ABANDONED BY KEESLER FLD MISS 16 JAN 45 AND OFF

AND EM DEARED DEAD BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT COLON

CAPT STACY F HOLLAND 3725864 ✓

20 LT EDWIN R GRESHAM 3771732 ✓

CPL GEORGE J KENNEDY 13187685

CPL JOHN W SCHAEFERLE 33513726 ✓

PFC ROBERT B RIFE 15375523 ✓

03167

2947

FEB 28 8 12 AM 1945

✓ A4A(E)

05

File

A55

DB101

OB105

UAWS V UOHA75 WD

FROM RICE COAF AAF GREAT BEND KANSAS 272152Z

TO COMMANDING GENERAL HQ AFAPS WINSTONSALEM NCAR

GRNC

SP GP1226 PD

CITE AFAPS 1155 DASH 1 DTD 27 FEB 45 PD SEARCH FOR THE FOL NAMED EM AND
OF CMA MISSING FROM ACFT ACCIDENT OVER GULF OF MEXICO 27 NOVEMBER 44
CMA ABANDONED REPEAT ABANDONED BY KEESLER FLD MISS 16 JAN 45 AND OFF
AND EM DEMARED DEAD BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT COLON

CAPT STACY F HOLLAND 0725064

2D LT EDWIN H GRESHAM 0771702

CPL GEORGE J KENNEDY 13187685

CPL JOHN D SCHAEBERLE 33513726

PFC ROBERT D RIFE 15375523

0316Z

574

MAR 5 7 16 PM 1945

A56

V

DA274

OB97

UAW5 V UOHA NR108 WB

FROM RICE COAF GREAT BEND KANSAS 052030Z

TO COMMANDING GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AFAPS WINSTON SALEM
NORTH CAROLINA

GR NC

SP GP 232 PD

CITE AFAPS 120 DASH I DTD 3 MAR 45 PD 2D LT JOHN F KELLY 0860701 AND
PFC RICHARD H LITTLE JR 35903370 DIED AS RESULT OF DROWNING 27 NOV 44
AFTER BAILING OUT OVER GULF OF MEXICO PD BODIES RECOVERED PD CPL JOHN
D SCHAEBERLE 33513726 DECLARED DEAD 16 JAN 45 AFTER SEARCH ABANDONED PD
SPELLING OF NAMES COCRECT

2032Z

574

100 7 10 11 22

A56

V

DA274

OB97

UAWS V UOHA NR108 WB

FROM RICE COAF GREAT BEND KANSAS 052030Z

TO COMMANDING GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AFAFS WINSTON SALEM

NORTH CAROLINA

GR NC

SP GP 232 PD

CITE AFAFS 120 DASH I DTD 3 MAR 45 PD 2D LT JOHN F KELLY 0860701 AND

PFC RICHARD H LITTLE JR 35903370 DIED AS RESULT OF DROWNING 27 NOV 44

AFTER BAILING OUT OVER GULF OF MEXICO PD BODIES RECOVERED PD CPL JOHN

D SCHAEBERLE 33513726 DECLARED DEAD 16 JAN 45 AFTER SEARCH ABANDONED PD

SPELLING OF NAMES COCRECT

2032Z

W. 00 file 39.11

RECEIVED

1944 NOV 28 16 47

HQ. A.A.F.
FLT. CONTROL COMD.

WUB 22 GOVT
WUX MEMPHIS TENN 28 1111A
CHIEF OF REGIONS OFFICE FLYING SAFETY WN

134-N PD MAJOR JOHNSON AND CAPTAIN NOWITSKY COVERING VHB
OCCURRENCE AT KEESLER FILE DP PD DEPARTED 1105 PD 28
1107Z SIGNED ROSS END
BRISCOEMM.....

RECD WU 8 OK FRJ AT 1245PM

-123-

727

*Col Ball spoke to
Major Ross. advised
that Reg 7 was covering
and directed John
Nowitsky to 8-2. Not self-
re-acting. 1329 acc
B-1.*

